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ABSTRACT
From 1889 to 1910, while serving on the United States Supreme Court,
the first Justice John Marshall Harlan taught at the Columbian College of
Law, which became the George Washington University School of Law. For
two decades, he primarily taught working-class evening students in classes as
diverse as property, torts, conflicts of law, jurisprudence, domestic relations,
commercial law, evidence-and most significantly-constitutional law.
Harlan's lectures on constitutional law would have been lost to history,
but for the enterprising initiative-and remarkable note-taking-of one of
Harlan's students, George Johannes. During the 1897-98 academic year,
George Johannes and a classmate transcribed verbatim the twenty-seven lec-
tures Justice Harlan delivered on constitutional law. In 1955, Johannes sent
the transcripts to the second Justice Harlan. The papers were ultimately de-
posited in the Library of Congress. Though much attention has been given to
the life and jurisprudence of Justice Harlan, his lectures have been largely
ignored.
Harlan's lectures are a treasure trove of insights into his jurisprudence, as
well as the state of constitutional law at the turn of the 20th century. They
provide the unique opportunity to listen in as one of our greatest Justices lec-
tures on the precipice of a constitutional revolution that he helped create. In
this article, we use the lectures to paint a picture of who Justice Harlan was,
what he believed, how he sought to impart that knowledge to the future law-
yers of America, and how he predicted many of the changes in constitutional
law that occurred during the 20th century.
This article, published along with the annotated transcript of all twenty-
seven lectures and written on the centennial of Justice Harlan's death, is a
tribute to one of the giants of the law, and his contribution to legal education.
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INTRODUCTION
I have often been astounded to meet with lawyers who
have actually never read the Constitution of the United
States, although it can be read within the time that is wasted
at a street corner some afternoon discussing the last game of
baseball or the last prize fight. They may have examined
particular clauses, but have never read the entire instrument
so as to comprehend in a general way the system of govern-
ment ordained by it ....
Now, I beg you that this may not be said of any member
of this law class that he allow this week to pass without read-
ing the Constitution. Some knowledge of the principles un-
derlying the government under which we live ought to be
possessed by every person who owes duties to that govern-
ment, or upon whom its laws operate, or who depends upon
it for protection of his life, liberty, and property. Freedom
and free institutions cannot long be entertained by a people
who do not understand the nature of the government under
which they live.'
-Justice John Marshall Harlan 1, October 14, 1897.
From 1889 to 1910, while serving on the United States Supreme
Court, the first Justice John Marshall Harlan taught at the Columbian
College of Law, which later became The George Washington Univer-
sity School of Law. For two decades, he primarily taught working-
class evening students in classes as diverse as property, torts, conflicts
of law, jurisprudence, domestic relations, commercial law, evidence-
and most significantly-constitutional law.
Harlan's lectures on constitutional law would have been lost to
history but for the enterprising initiative-and remarkable note tak-
ing-of one of Harlan's students, George Johannes. During the
1897-1898 academic year, Johannes and a classmate transcribed ver-
batim the twenty-seven lectures Justice Harlan delivered on constitu-
tional law. In 1955, Johannes sent his copy of the transcripts to the
second Justice Harlan, who eventually deposited them in the Library
I Brian L. Frye, Josh Blackman & Michael McCloskey, eds., John Marshall Harlan: Lec-
tures on Constitutional Law, 1897-98, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 12, 14-15 (2013)
[hereinafter Justice Harlan's Lectures].
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of Congress.2 Harlan's life and jurisprudence have received a great
deal of scholarly attention. Yet, tragically, his lectures have been un-
available to the public, and as a result largely ignored.3 This Article,
along with the first edited and annotated transcription of Harlan's lec-
tures,4 will bring those priceless lessons to life.
Harlan's lectures provide a trove of insights into his jurispru-
dence, as well as the state of constitutional law at the turn of the twen-
tieth century. They offer the unique opportunity to listen in as one of
our greatest Justices lectures on the precipice of a constitutional
revolution that he helped create. This Article, written on the centen-
nial of Justice Harlan's death, is a tribute to one of the giants of the
law, and his contribution to legal education.
In Part I, we survey Justice Harlan's accomplished career. He
rose from humble origins in rural Kentucky, served as a Colonel in the
Civil War, and was eventually appointed to the United States Su-
preme Court.
In Part II, we provide a brief description of what law school was
like at the turn of the twentieth century. We explain why a Supreme
Court Justice would choose to serve as a law professor, and why
Harlan accepted such a busy teaching schedule-he taught at night
2 See Letter from George Johannes to John Marshall Harlan (Oct. 21, 1955) (on file with
the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The John Marshall Harlan Papers, 1810-1971, at
A2-1) [hereinafter The Harlan Papers], available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/06/DSC00475.jpg. The George Washington Law Review has made images of The Harlan
Papers available on our website to improve reader access to these sources. The collection can be
found at http://www.gwlr.org/2013/06/22/harlanpapers/.
Professor Frye purchased a microfilm copy of George Johannes's Japanese paper copy of
the transcription of Harlan's lectures from the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, made a
PDF version, and transcribed it verbatim, by hand. See Justice John Marshall Harlan: Lectures
on Constitutional Law, 1897-98, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://archive.org/details/JusticeJohnMar-
shallHarlanLecturesOnConstitutionalLawl897-98_26 (last visited June 23, 2013). He then ed-
ited and annotated the lectures, with the occasional assistance of several research assistants. The
lectures were edited to preserve all of Harlan's words as transcribed, except in cases of clear
transcription error. Paragraph breaks and punctuation were added as necessary, in order to
reflect the cadence of Harlan's speech. Quotations from the Constitution are set off in separate
paragraphs, unless the text requires otherwise. Questions from students are italicized. Refer-
ences are provided for all quotations. Citations are provided for all cases and publications dis-
cussed by Harlan. Additional annotations are provided when supplemental information will
help the reader better understand Harlan's commentary. See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra
note 1 (containing an edited and annotated transcription of Justice Harlan's lectures).
3 See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 266 n.43
(1995) (noting a preference for Harlan's judicial opinions over his lectures as a source of insight
into his philosophy). But see LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN 45 (1999).
4 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1.
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and on weekends, much to the chagrin of his wife Malvina, who was
not pleased that he would come home so late. We also consider the
ethical implications of a sitting Justice teaching constitutional law.
Justice Harlan routinely opined on cases before they had been de-
cided, and suggested how he would vote. After a case was decided, if
he had dissented, he would often humorously note, "I was one of the
minority, and of course I was wrong."5
We discuss Harlan's approach to lecturing without notes for two
hours each week, unlike his peers at Harvard, who used the Socratic
method. He taught the Constitution clause-by-clause, starting with
the Preamble and working his way to the recently enacted Fifteenth
Amendment. We show that Harlan started working on a previously
unknown constitutional law casebook, which he unfortunately never
finished. We close by explaining why Harlan stopped teaching when
the University suddenly reduced his salary.
In Part III, we use the lectures-as well as contemporary newspa-
per accounts, personal correspondences, and his judicial opinions-to
explain how Harlan's jurisprudence related to the state of constitu-
tional law at the turn of the twentieth century. Harlan's lectures sug-
gest that he was a proto-originalist, whose focus on Anglo-American
history and the views of the Framers of the Constitution anticipated
the constitutional philosophies of Justice Black, and more recently
Justice Scalia. This legal tradition informed Harlan's approach to
freedom of speech, religious liberty, economic liberty-as evidenced
in his dissent in Lochner v. New York6-and gender equality.
Harlan had a deep faith in the "providence" of American culture,
and the exceptionalism of its system of laws and liberty-a steadfast
belief that pervaded his philosophy. But Harlan's jurisprudence also
produced apparent contradictions. Although his powerful dissents in
Plessy v. Ferguson7 and the Civil Rights Cases8 presaged the civil rights
revolution of the twentieth century, his vote in United States v. Wong
Kim Ark9-coupled with extended discussions of that case-reveals
an inconsistent approach to equality and citizenship.
Finally, in Part IV, we analyze how Harlan augured the future of
constitutional law. Harlan's views were decades ahead of the Court's
jurisprudence. He saw what was to come in the twentieth century
5 See, e.g., id. at 342 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
6 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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with respect to the incorporation doctrine, Congress's powers under
the Commerce Clause, the Erie doctrine and vertical comity, as well as
separation of powers. Such thoughts were mere glimmers in the eyes
of nineteenth century jurists, but were on the forefront of Justice
Harlan's mind. Harlan's Constitution-as explained in his remarka-
bly detailed lectures-anticipated much of the Constitution as we
know it today.
In this Article, we use Harlan's lectures to help explain who Jus-
tice Harlan was, what he believed, how he sought to impart that
knowledge to the future lawyers of America, and how he predicted
many of the changes in constitutional law that occurred during the
twentieth century.
I. THE FIRST JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN
John Marshall Harlan was born in Boyle County, Kentucky on
June 1, 1833.10 His father, James Harlan, was a lawyer and prominent
Whig politician." After graduating from Centre College in 1850, and
Transylvania Law School in 1853, Harlan joined his father's law prac-
tice in Frankfort, Kentucky, and became active in Whig politics.12
Harlan's evolving position on slavery and his ascension in Kentucky
Republican politics paved the way for an unlikely path to the United
States Supreme Court.
The Whig Party was formed in the early 1830s to oppose Jackso-
nian democracy.13 It was the unofficial heir of the Federalist Party,
and its platform emphasized tariffs and internal improvements.14 It
elected two Presidents, William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor,
but its leader was Henry Clay, a close friend of James Harlan's.15
Among many other things, Clay drafted the Compromise of 1850,
which defused tensions over slavery and delayed secession and civil
war. 16
10 William E. Read & William C. Berman, Papers of the First Justice Harlan at the Univer-
sity of Louisville, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 57, 58 (1967).
11 Id. James Harlan was the United States Representative for the Twenty-fifth District of
Kentucky from 1835-1839, the Secretary of State of Kentucky from 1840-1844, a member of the
Kentucky House of Representatives in 1845, and the Attorney General of Kentucky from
1850-1863. Harlan, James (1860-1863), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000210 (last visited May 28, 2013).
12 Read & Berman, supra note 10, at 58-59.
13 See MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY. JACKSO-
NIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR, 1-18 (1999).
14 Id. at 738.
15 Id. at 1.
16 Id. at 554.
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By 1852, the Whig Party was disintegrating, mainly over slavery. 7
Southern Whigs supported slavery and Northern Whigs opposed it,
creating an irreconcilable division.'8 The Whig Party finally dissolved
in 1854 when Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, repealing
the Missouri Compromise and opening Kansas to slavery. 19 Most
Northern Whigs joined the new Republican Party, but Southern
Whigs were adrift.20
Like most Kentucky Whigs, Harlan supported slavery, but op-
posed secession.2 1 Kentucky was a slave state, and the Harlan family
owned about a dozen slaves.2 2 When the Whig Party disappeared,
Harlan supported whichever party opposed the Democrats and seces-
sion. 2 3 In 1855, he joined the American or "Know-Nothing" Party,
which opposed immigration and Catholicism. 2 4 When its appeal
waned, he joined the Opposition Party.25
In 1858, Harlan was elected judge of the Franklin County Court,
his first elected office. 26 Later that year, on the Opposition Party
ticket, which supported slavery and opposed the Democrats, he ran
for Congress, but narrowly lost.2 7 In 1860, Harlan switched affiliations
again and joined the Constitutional Union Party, which was neutral on
slavery and opposed secession, and campaigned for its unsuccessful
presidential nominee. 28
As the Civil War began in 1861, Kentucky was torn between
North and South. For example, Senator Powell supported the Union,
and Senator Breckinridge quit to join the Confederacy. 29 While the
legislature was mostly pro-Union, Governor Magoffin favored the
Confederacy and refused President Lincoln's call for volunteers. 30 As
a captain of the Unionist Home Guards, Harlan opposed the seces-
17 See id. at 726-64.
18 Id.
19 Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
20 HOLT, supra note 13, at 916.
21 G. Edward White, John Marshall Harlan : The Precursor, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 6
(1975).
22 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 20.
23 Id. at 34.
24 FRANK B. LATHAM, THE GREAT DISSENTER: JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN 1833-1911, at
10-11 (1970).
25 Id. at 15.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 15-17.
28 Id. at 17-18.
29 Id. at 20-22.
30 Id. at 20-21.
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sionist Southern Rights State Guards by delivering speeches and dis-
tributing guns to Unionists."1
When the Confederate Army occupied Kentucky in August 1861,
the legislature declared itself for the Union, but public sentiment was
still split between North and South.3 2 Harlan responded to the occu-
pation by raising a Union regiment, the Tenth Kentucky Infantry.33
He was commissioned as a Colonel, and led his regiment honorably
and effectively. 34 When Harlan's father died in 1863, he resigned his
commission and returned to Frankfort to run the family law office.35
Later that year, Harlan joined the Union Party and was elected Attor-
ney General of Kentucky.36 While Harlan supported the Union, he
denounced the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Eman-
cipation Proclamation.37 In 1864, he even campaigned for George Mc-
Clellan, the Democratic presidential candidate.3 8
Initially, Harlan opposed the Reconstruction Amendments be-
cause he believed that they infringed on states' rights and would "de-
stroy our kind of government." 3 9 In 1865, he joined the Conservative
Union Party, which opposed the Reconstruction Amendments. 40
Then in 1867, he helped form the Conservative Union Democratic
Party, an abortive attempt to court Democrats. 41
But in 1868, Harlan changed his mind and joined the Republican
Party.42 He campaigned for Ulysses S. Grant, the Republican presi-
dential candidate, 43 and supported the Reconstruction Amendments,
calling slavery "the most perfect despotism that ever existed on this
earth."" Accused of opportunism, he responded, "Let it be said that I
am right rather than consistent."4 5 Harlan's decision to become a Re-
publican was probably motivated by both political and moral factors. 4 6
31 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 22-23; PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 35.
32 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 20.
33 Id. at 27.
34 Id. at 27-30.
35 Read & Berman, supra note 10, at 59.
36 Id.
37 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 38-39.
38 Id. at 39.
39 LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE 75 (1992) (quot-
ing Letter from John Marshall Harlan to John W. Combs (June 1, 1865)).
40 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 38.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 39.
43 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 58.
44 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 41.
45 Id.
46 See Charles Thompson, Plessy v. Ferguson: Harlan's Great Dissent, Ky. HuMAN., Apr.
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Many years later, Harlan's students applauded when he declaimed,
"Out of this [Dred Scottt 7 case] came the Republican party of today.
[Applause]."48 Dred Scott "was a sort of special providence to this
country," Harlan said, "in that it laid the foundation of a civil war
which, terrible as it was, awful as it was in its consequences in the loss
of life and money, was in the end a blessing to this country, in that it
rid us of the institution of African slavery."49
Harlan quickly became the leader of the Kentucky Republicans.50
He was the Republican candidate for Governor in 1871 and 1875, but
lost both elections.-, In 1876, Harlan led the Kentucky delegation to
the Republican National Convention in Cincinnati, Ohio.5 2 When the
convention deadlocked, he delivered Kentucky's votes to Rutherford
B. Hayes, who won the nomination.5 3 The Democratic candidate for
President was Samuel J. Tilden.5 4 After the election, Hayes and
Tilden both claimed victory.55 The decision went to an electoral com-
mission, which awarded the election to Hayes.56 On March 2, 1877,
Congress accepted the commission's findings, and Hayes became the
President.57
On March 4, 1877, Justice David Davis resigned from the Su-
preme Court in order to become a Senator.58  After some delibera-
tion, Hayes nominated Harlan to fill the empty seat on October 17,
1877.59 There was some opposition to Harlan, primarily from two
Senators who were interested in the position for themselves. 60 On No-
vember 29, 1877, however, the Senate unanimously confirmed the ap-
1996, available at http://www.law.louisville.edullibrary/collections/harlan/dissent. Compare YAR-
BROUGH, supra note 3, at 66 (arguing that Harlan joined the Republican Party and adopted its
platform out of expediency), with BETH, supra note 39, at 75 (arguing that Harlan joined the
Republican Party because his private opinions on racial issues were more liberal than his public
opinions).
47 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)
48 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 40 (Lecture No. 3, Oct. 23, 1897).
49 Id. at 264 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
50 BETH, supra note 39, at 88.
51 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 58, 66-68.
52 Id. at 69.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 70.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 207 n.350 (Lecture No. 17, Feb. 19, 1898).
58 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 71.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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pointment, and on December 10, 1877, Harlan was sworn in.61 He was
only forty-four years old, one of the youngest justices in Supreme
Court history.62
Harlan served as a Supreme Court Justice from December 10,
1877 until his death on October 14, 1911.63 He is the sixth-longest-
serving Justice.64 When Harlan joined the Court, the Justices were
obliged to "ride circuit," or sit on a federal circuit court by designa-
tion.6 5 Justice Howell Edmunds Jackson was already assigned to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which included Kentucky, so Harlan
was initially assigned to the Seventh Circuit, which included Wiscon-
sin, Illinois, and Indiana. 66 In 1891, Congress abolished circuit riding,
to the great relief of the Justices.67 The Justices were still assigned to
circuits for special purposes, however, and when Justice Jackson died
in 1895, Harlan was reassigned to the Sixth Circuit.68 Today, a portrait
of Harlan hangs in the Sixth Circuit's library in Louisville, Kentucky.
Harlan loved his job. He was friendly with his colleagues and
popular with the public.69 Harlan's relationship with his brethren,
however, was complicated. While he agreed with Justice Field on civil
rights, he disagreed on the scope of federal power.70 He was not close
with progressive judges, like Justices Holmes and Brandeis.7 1 He was
also not close with Justice Hughes.7 2 Instead, Harlan cultivated his
reputation as a "common man," one of the last "tobacco-spittin'
judges." 73 The newspapers celebrated Harlan's opinions and dissents,
and often ran photos of him playing golf, drinking bourbon, and talk-
ing to coachmen. 74
Like many Justices, Harlan found his salary inadequate. For ex-
ample, Chief Justice Waite earned only $10,500 a year, and was nearly
61 BETH, supra note 39, at 128-29, 133.
62 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 71.
63 Id. at 157-58
64 See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREME CT., http://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited May 29, 2013).
65 BETH, supra note 39, at 138.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 164.
68 Id. at 162.
69 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 113-14.
70 See id. at 104-05, 109-11.
71 See Read & Berman, supra note 10, at 67 (noting there is no existing correspondence
between Harlan and Holmes or Brandeis).
72 See id. (noting there is no existing correspondence between the two Justices).
73 LATHAM, supra note 24, at 114.
74 See, e.g., Harlan Led the Way: Chevy Chase "Old Boys" Beat Columbia Club Golfers,
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1905, at SP1.
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bankrupt when he died in 1888.75 In the early 1880s, Harlan consid-
ered resigning from the Court.76 Instead, like many of his brethren, he
supplemented his income by teaching.
II. HARLAN THE PROFESSOR
From 1889 to 1910, Harlan was a professor at the Columbian Col-
lege of Law, which eventually became The George Washington Uni-
versity Law School.77 He primarily taught constitutional law, but also
lectured about personal property law,7 8 torts,79 conflicts of law,80 juris-
prudence of the United States, domestic relations, commercial law,
evidence,8 and perhaps other subjects. Unfortunately, his students
only recorded his constitutional law lectures. 82 This Section explores
what Columbian was like at the turn of the century, what it meant for
a Justice to moonlight as a professor, and how Harlan approached
pedagogy. It also recounts Harlan's unceremonious departure from
the law school after the University reduced his salary.
A. Columbian College of Law at the Turn of the Century
The George Washington University Law School, known as the
Columbian College of Law until 1904, is the oldest law school in the
District of Columbia.83 President James Monroe chartered Columbian
on February 9, 1821, and the trustees elected William Cranch and Wil-
liam Thomas Carroll as the first law professors.84 Cranch was a mid-
night appointee of President Adams to serve on the D.C. Circuit
Court, and President Jefferson later elevated him to chief judge.85 He
75 CLARE CUSHMAN, COURTWATCHERS: EYEWITNEss AccouNTs IN SUPREME COURT His-
TORY 221 (2011).
76 BETH, supra note 39, at 143.
77 Probing the Law School's Past: 1821-1962, AMIcus CURIAE, May 1962, reprinted at GW
& FOGGY BOrrOM HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Dec. 21, 2006), http://encyclopedia.gwu.edu/
gwencyclopedialindex.php?title=ProbingjtheLawSchoolE2%80%99s Past:_1821-1962.
78 University Notes, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 1900, at 12.
79 Id.; Columbian University Notes, WASH. POST, May 12, 1895, at 5 (describing how
Harlan's students were examined on torts and constitutional law in separate exams for the first
time in 1895).
80 Lectures at School of Diplomacy, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1900, at 16.
81 Columbian University Annual Meeting (June 15, 1891) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-161), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/DSC00433.jpg.
82 See generally Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1.
83 Probing the Law School's Past, supra note 77.
84 Id.
85 Theodore Voorhees, The District of Columbia Courts: A Judicial Anomaly, 29 CATH. U.
L. REV. 917, 920 (1980).
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is best known for serving as a reporter for the United States Supreme
Court,8 6 recording for posterity famous cases such as Marbury v.
Madison.87 Carroll was the clerk of the United States Supreme Court
from 1827 to 1863.8 Due to a lack of funds, the first incarnation of
Columbian College of Law folded; however, the school was eventually
reopened in 1865.89
Nineteenth century law schools were very different from law
schools today. At Columbian, for example, a law degree only re-
quired two years of study.90 Tuition for one year was $8091-approxi-
mately $2,000 in 2010 dollars.92 Prepaying for both years cost only
$150.93 Initially, Columbian accepted anyone who enrolled, regardless
of his prior qualifications. 9 4 Beginning in 1899, it required all students
to have "an education equivalent to a high school course." 95 The As-
sociation of American Law Schools was founded in 1900, with the Co-
lumbian College of Law as one of its charter members. 96 The Law
School permitted women to enroll in 1911, and Marion Clark became
the first female graduate of the school in 1916.97
Amazingly, the faculty of the Columbian College of Law included
three Justices of the Supreme Court: Justices Harlan, Strong, and
Brewer. 98 Justice William Strong, who retired from the Court in 1880,
taught classes in constitutional jurisprudence from 1881-1888.99 From
1890-1908, Justice David Josiah Brewer taught corporations'00 and in-
ternational law,' 0 and possibly other subjects. The University con-
structed the Harlan-Brewer House on the northeast corner of 20th
86 Probing the Law School's Past, supra note 77.
87 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
88 G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-35, in 3 THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 384-85
n.2 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988).
89 Probing the Law School's Past, supra note 77.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See ROBERT C. SAHR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) CONVERSION FACTORS 1774 TO
ESTIMATED 2022 TO CONVERT TO DOLLARS OF 2010 (2012), available at http://oregonstate.edul
cla/poliscilsites/default/files/facultyifiles/sahr/cv2010.pdf.
93 Probing the Law School's Past, supra note 77.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See id.; Women of GW Law, L. Ass'N FOR WOMEN, http://docs.law.gwu.edulstdg/law-
women/womenofgwlaw.htm (last visited May 29, 2013).
98 Probing the Law School's Past, supra note 77.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Lectures at School of Diplomacy, supra note 80.
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and H Streets N.W. to honor two of its most prominent professors,102
though this building is no longer in existence. Columbian also drew
other high profile faculty members, such as Professor William
Maury.10 Maury was appointed Assistant Attorney General of the
United States by President Harrison in 1889, and was "one of the most
loved professors of the school."104
B. A Justice and a Teacher
Today, it is common for most Supreme Court Justices to guest
lecture in law school classes and to teach brief study abroad courses
during the Supreme Court's summer recess. 0 Justice Harlan, how-
ever, was a regular member of Columbian's faculty and taught a full
course load while the Supreme Court was in session.10 6 Furthermore,
as a full-time member of the faculty, Harlan taught at inconvenient
times-evenings and weekends 07 for he was otherwise occupied dur-
ing the week. And he had to teach classes other than constitutional
law that were less than glamorous.
Harlan's teaching style reflected his conception of constitutional
law. While his counterparts at Harvard had begun to adopt Langdell's
Socratic method of lecturing,108 Harlan simply delivered a lecture, and
took occasional questions from his students.109 Interestingly, he lec-
tured from memory, and did not even use notes: "Exactly how much
of the subject I covered I do not remember, as I talk to you without
notes, and if I should, in what I am going to say, cover somewhat the
same ground, why it will not hurt you to hear it again.""i0
Oddly, no one objected to the idea of a Justice teaching constitu-
tional law. Nor did anyone appear to object to Harlan opining on
undecided cases. In his lectures, Harlan often remarked that the Su-
102 Probing the Law School's Past, supra note 77.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See, e.g., Press Release, S Tex. Coll. of Law, South Texas Students Learn from U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts, available at http://stcl.edu/hottopics/stcl-students-
learn from justicejohn-roberts.html.
106 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 126-34 (Lecture No. 11, Jan. 8, 1898).
107 Id. at 242 (Lecture No. 19, Mar. 5, 1898) ("I will complete what I have to say about the
judicial power of the Constitution next Saturday night . . . ."); see also PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra
note 3, at 46.
108 See generally W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1 (1997).
109 See generally Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1.
110 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 126 (Lecture No. 11, Jan. 8, 1898).
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preme Court was considering an issue, and explained his own thoughts
on the proper outcome of the case."'
1. Harlan's Classes and Schedule
Due to his duties at the Court, Harlan could only teach on eve-
nings and weekends. His students were mostly working-class men,
many of whom were government clerks like Johannes, trying to obtain
a law degree at night. 112 Apparently, Harlan's schedule varied. For
example, in 1895, he taught Torts on Monday evenings at seven
o'clock. 113 A 1902 Boston Globe article, which relayed the humorous
story of how Harlan broke up a fight after class, suggests he was still
teaching a "regular lecture [in] the evening," 114 even though the eve-
ning program may have been eliminated at that point."5 Harlan
bucked a moving trend towards eliminating the evening classes.116
While Harlan professed to love teaching, it appears that he taught
primarily in order to supplement his income. "Harlan's annual salary
was $10,000 when he joined the Court, increased to $12,500 in 1903,
and was $14,500 in 1911, the year of his death."117 When Columbian
hired Harlan as "Professor of the Federal Jurisprudence of the United
States, of Domestic Relations, of Commercial Law, and of the Law of
Evidence" in 1891, it offered a salary of $2,000 a year-twenty percent
of his annual income.s18 And Harlan was not alone. Justice Brewer
who was willing to accept a lower fee, taught corporations for $500 a
year. 19
Harlan explained to his students how difficult it was to live in
Washington, D.C. on a government salary:
Well, why should not a man be paid because he is a ser-
vant of the public? We compensate our Senators and Repre-
sentatives in a moderate degree, in order that they may give
themselves to the service of the country, and if that were not
111 Id.
112 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 46.
113 Columbian University Notes, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1895, at 15.
114 Prevented a Class Fight, Bos. DAILY GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1902, at 5.
115 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 46 ("When George Washington University joined the
Association of American Law Schools in 1902, night classes were ended.").
116 Id. ("By teaching working men at night, Harlan was also at odds with the efforts to do
away with night schools on the grounds that their admission standards and requirements were
too low.").
117 MALVINA SHANKLIN HARLAN, SOME MEMORIES OF A LONG LIFE, 1854-1911, at 260
n.118 (2003).
118 Columbian University Annual Meeting, supra note 81.
119 Id.
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the rule, it would have occurred in the history of our country
that we would have lost the services of some of the greatest
men that have figured in all our history. And we pay them
little enough. No Senator, except upon the utmost economy,
can get along in the city of Washington, make ends meet at
the close of each year, upon the salary he gets. No Repre-
sentative can do it, or very few can.
Well, you ask, if that is so, why do they remain in public
life? I cannot tell, except from the feeling of the ambition
that is planted in the breast of every man to live after he is
dead and gone in the memory of his fellow citizens. I can
understand why a man may be willing to give his whole life,
and lead a life of poverty and self-denial, if by so doing he
can make a great name in his country.
That is true of our profession. There are very few law-
yers that have the gift of money making. There are very few
lawyers that lay up large estates, and when you find the law-
yer who loves money better than he does the practice of his
profession, it is absolutely certain that he never makes a
great lawyer or a good lawyer. 12 0
Harlan's wife Malvina lamented his paltry salary and inconve-
nient schedule, which required a late commute to his home in Rock-
ville, Maryland:
Thus, for two years my husband became a "Commuter," tak-
ing the tiresome thirty-two miles ride in and out, six times
each week. Three times a week, however, he remained in
town until the mid-evening train, in order to teach his class at
the Law School of what is now the George Washington Uni-
versity-a position which, in spite of the arduous work it en-
tailed, he felt compelled to retain, as his judicial salary was
not large enough to provide for the education and mainte-
nance of our surviving five children and our grand-
daughter.121
Harlan even considered resigning from the Supreme Court and
accepting a position as a lecturer at the University of Chicago, at a
salary of $25,000 per year:122
I should be greatly tempted to surrender my present position
and accept his offer. I could imagine nothing more agreeable
120 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 86 (Lecture No. 7, Nov. 20, 1897).
121 HARLAN, supra note 117, at 117 (citations omitted).
122 Read & Berman, supra note 10, at 65 ("To Willson, he [Harlan] indicates that he would
be tempted to accept if Rockefeller offered him $25,000 per year to lecture at the University of
Chicago, as Rockefeller had offered to Harrison.").
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to me than to spend the balance of my life in that sort of
work. I think I may say without egotism, that I can perform
that work better than any I have ever undertaken.123
Ultimately, he declined the offer, remained on the Supreme
Court, and continued teaching at The George Washington University
Law School until 1910.124
2. Relationship with Students
Harlan was a remarkably popular professor. According to one
newspaper account:
Promptly at 7 o'clock Justice Harlan enters and takes his seat
on the platform. His appearance is greeted with cheer after
cheer from the students and visitors. He must . . . wait a
minute or two before he can make his voice heard above the
clamor of approval. Then his great form, clad frequently in
evening dress, rises amid the hisses of the boys for silence,
and by the time he has uttered his familiar greeting-"young
gentlemen of the law class"-the dropping of a pin can al-
most be heard, so still is the room and close the attention
paid him, which continues to the end of the lecture, though
interrupted with popular applause, or laughter, at the fre-
quent fine points scored, and witty thrusts.125
As one of Harlan's students recalled, "[t]he spontaneity of the
applause that frequently marked the beginning and close of his ses-
sions, was sufficient evidence of the appreciation the members had of
him."126
Even outside the classroom, Justice Harlan was an imposing fig-
ure on campus. A large and powerful man, Harlan was not just a
teacher; he was a mentor. In 1902, at the ripe age of sixty-nine, he
"interfered and prevented a class fight between the freshmen and
sophomores . . . . [T]he eminent jurist . . . reached over the heads of
the assaulting party, and seizing the leader of the forces by the collar,
dragged him from the fight." 127 He sought to inspire his students to
greatness in the legal profession. Harlan deeply respected the legal
123 Id. at 65 n.30 (quoting Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Augustus Willson (Mar. 13,
1893)).
124 BETH, supra note 39, at 186.
125 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 44-45 (citing LITTLE ROCK SATURDAY BEE, Apr.16,
1895 (on file with The John Marshall Harlan Collection, Univ. of Louisville)).
126 BETH, supra note 39, at 186 (quoting Letter from Almon C. Kellogg to Richard D.
Harlan (May 27, 1930) (on file with The John Marshall Harlan Collection, Univ. of Louisville)).
127 Prevented a Class Fight, supra note 114.
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profession, and remarked at a banquet at Columbian Law School,
"[t]he mainstay of the country at critical moments was [the legal] pro-
fession," noting that if the legislature "were composed of farmers,
merchants, and ministers, and lawyers left out, there would be pro-
duced statutes which no man could understand."128
Harlan believed in shared interests and the power of collective
action. He often spoke directly to his students, referring to them as
"you."129 Similarly, he referred to America as "we," assuming that all
Americans had similar interests.130 On one occasion, Harlan wrote to
the President of George Washington University:
One of the pleasantest features of my labors was the receipt
of letters from students, in every section, who attended my
lectures and who said that the time passed with me was both
delightful and instructive. I was buoyed up with the thought
that my lectures had much to do with spreading safe and
sound thoughts about our National Government and the
Constitution under which it was organized.' 31
Harlan cultivated a warmly paternalistic relationship with his stu-
dents. He urged them to read the Constitution and learn about Amer-
ican history. He counseled against radical politics and jingoism,
criticizing secessionists and progressives alike. For example, he closed
one lecture by advising his students not to jump to conclusions about
the USS Maine, which had just sunk in Havana Harbor. Referencing
the event obliquely as "the great calamity that has occurred in the
waters nearby," Harlan told his students "not to lose their heads," but
rather to "keep cool, and not to pass judgments upon grave questions
when you have not the facts before you."132 He admonished his class
that the legal profession teaches us to "wait until the case is presented
before you to reach a final conclusion."133 Harlan explained that he
hoped the sinking was not "an act of treachery and duplicity," but
128 Columbian Law School Banquet, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1897, at 9.
129 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 81 (Lecture No. 7, Nov. 20, 1897); see
also PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 61-62.
130 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 14 (Lecture No. 1, Oct. 14, 1897); see
also PRZYBY"ZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 61-62 ("He used . . . the second-person pronoun-'you'
instead of 'one'-in order to involve his students .... He often used the pronoun 'we' to include
his students in [the] belief [that the U.S. Constitution was superior to any other plan of govern-
ment that had ever existed].").
131 BETH, supra note 39, at 187 (quoting Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Walter C.
Clephane (Aug. 4. 1910) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note
2)).
132 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 213 (Lecture No. 17, Feb. 19, 1898).
133 Id.
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rather an accident.134 And he emphasized national unity, proclaiming
that if it was not an accident, "we will not hear any more of North,
South, East, or West in this country, but we will only hear of Ameri-
cans."' 35 After speeches like this, his students often responded with a
standing ovation, reflecting their respect and admiration for their be-
loved professor.13 6
C. Pedagogical Approach
Pedagogically, Harlan's lectures would be foreign to most mod-
ern day law students. At the time, law professors were gradually
adopting the Socratic method of teaching advocated by Langdell.13 7
However, Harlan resisted this trend and continued to use a more
traditional lecture format. 38 Harlan lectured for two hours straight,
taking occasional questions from his students.139 Remarkably, he did
not use any notes, lecturing entirely from memory, including case
names and even citations.140
Harlan saw the Constitution as an expression of American values
and a source of civic virtue, and used his lectures to cultivate those
values. He saw his students as future leaders, and reminded them of
their responsibility to the commonwealth. 141 In particular, he empha-
sized the critical role that lawyers have played in America's history.142
1. Harlan's Casebook
At first, Harlan used Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States as his textbook, and borrowed much
of Story's analysis of the Constitution.14 3 However, by 1907, he was
using Emilin McClain's Selections of Cases and Constitutional Law
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 45.
137 Id. at 46.
138 Id. ("Harlan appears naive in the eyes of many legal scholars .... Harlan did not even
have the saving grace of using the new case method of teaching begun at Harvard Law School
under Christopher C. Langdell in 1870, a method that still reigns in law schools today.").
139 See generally id. at 45-47, 60-61.
140 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 126 (Lecture No. 11, Jan. 8, 1898).
141 See, e.g., id. at 85-86 (Lecture 7, Nov. 20, 1897) (commending public officials for sacri-
ficing personal wealth in order to serve as senators, representatives, and lawyers).
142 See, e.g., id at 23 (Lecture No. 2, Oct. 21, 1897) (stating that "it is true in the history of
all the Anglo-Saxon race, and many other races, that it is the lawyer that has stepped forward
and has put himself in the way of arbitrary power to defend the rights of man.").
143 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 60.
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and Thomas Cooley's General Principles of Constitutional Law in the
United States of America.'"
In a 1910 letter, Harlan stated that he was working on a casebook
consisting of "select cases on constitutional law."145 While there is no
evidence that Harlan ever completed his casebook, his personal pa-
pers suggest that he made some progress on it. For example, he made
a list of certain Supreme Court cases in which he had participated that
touched on issues of constitutional law.146 He made notations on sev-
eral of those cases, wrote one-paragraph summaries, and marked up
the text of the Supreme Court's opinions.147
One such case was Dorr v. United States.14 s Dorr, a follow-up to
the Insular Cases, considered whether "trial by jury is a necessary inci-
dent of judicial procedure in the Philippine Islands, where demand for
trial by that method has been made by the accused and denied by the
courts established in the islands." 4 9 The Court upheld the trial with-
out a jury.5 0 Harlan dissented, adhering to the view that the protec-
tions of the Bill of Rights were fundamental and protected the right to
trial by jury.151 This was a precursor to what we now know as the
incorporation doctrine.
Harlan wrote a one-paragraph summary of Dorr.152 Below the
summary Harlan scribbled "c book," presumably referring to his in-
tended casebook. 53 Harlan appended to his typed summary of Dorr a
144 GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY BULLETIN 169
(1907).
145 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 220 n.10 (citing Letter from John Marshall Harlan to
Walter C. Clephane (Aug. 4, 1910) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers)).
146 See generally Case Summary of Dorr v. United States (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-31), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/DSC00302.jpg (paragraph summary of Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904)); Annotated Copy of Dorr v. United States (on file with the Library of Congress, The
Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-37), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/06/DSC00308.jpg (handwritten notation on a copy of Dorr, 195 U.S. 138).
147 Id.
148 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
149 Id. at 139.
150 Id. at 153.
151 Id. at 154. (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe now any more than I did when
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, was decided, that the provisions of the Federal Constitution as
to grand and petit juries relate to mere methods of procedure and are not fundamental in their
nature. In my opinion, guaranties for the protection of life, liberty and property, as embodied in
the Constitution, are for the benefit of all, of whatever race or nativity, in the States composing
the Union, or in any territory, however acquired, over the inhabitants of which the Government
of the United States may exercise the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.").
152 Case Summary of Dorr v. United States, supra note 146.
153 Id.
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marked-up copy of the case itself.154 He crossed out elements, mostly
citations to the Lawyers' Edition and the Supreme Court Reporter.1 55
At the conclusion of Justice Day's majority opinion, Harlan scribbled
at the bottom of the page, "The balance of Peckham's [concurring]
opinion and all of mine [dissenting]."156 This suggests that he sought
to include in the casebook part of Peckham's concurring opinion-
and to no one's surprise-all of his own dissenting opinion.
Harlan also wrote a one-page summary of Dooley v. United
States.1 17 Dooley found unconstitutional a fifteen percent duty im-
posed on all merchandise imported to Puerto Rico from the United
States.1 58 Typewritten at the bottom of the page is "(Get opinion and
dissenting opinions)."159 This sentence was crossed out.160 Following
the summary, he included an annotated copy of the case. 161 Harlan
repeated this process for several more cases. 162 All of the cases dealt
with the application of laws to territories, including Hawaii and Puerto
Rico. This could have been the beginning of Harlan's unpublished
casebook.
Imagine a Justice today publishing a casebook with his own opin-
ions! Today, people might consider it improper for Justices to publicly
discuss cases they have decided, based on a potential appearance of
impropriety. It is unlikely that a current Justice would publish a
casebook discussing cases in which he or she participated. But in
Harlan's day it was quite normal. For example, Justice Thomas M.
Cooley published many treatises touching on cases he had decided,
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Annotated Copy of Dorr v. United States, supra note 146.
157 Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 235 (1901); Case Summary of Dooley v. United
States (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-40), availa-
ble at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSCO031l.jpg.
158 Dooley, 182 U.S. at 235.
159 Case Summary of Dooley v. United States, supra note 157.
160 Id.
161 Annotated Copy of Dooley v. United States (on file with the Library of Congress, The
Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-41-52), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/06/DSC00312.jpg.
162 E.g., Case Summary of DeLima v. Bidwell (on file with the Library of Congress, The
Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-53), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/06/DSC00324.jpg; Case Summary of Downes v. Bidwell (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-58), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/06/DSC00329.jpg; Case Summary of Hawaii v. Mankichi (on file with the Library
of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-59), available at http://www.gwir.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00330.jpg; Annotated Copy of The Diamond Rings Case (on file
with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-54-57), available at http://
www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00325.jpg.
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among others.163 Likewise, Justice Story's Commentaries were effec-
tively analyses of cases that he participated in deciding.'64
2. Harlan Did Not Use the Socratic Method
During the 1897-1898 term, Justice Harlan taught twenty-seven
classes on constitutional law, every Saturday for two hours.165 Unlike
the Langdellians at Harvard, Justice Harlan did not use the Socratic
method of teaching; rather, he lectured.166 He began with a discussion
of the Magna Carta, Anglo-American legal history, the Declaration of
Independence, and the legal philosophies of the American Revolu-
tion.16 7 He then proceeded through the Constitution article by article,
clause by clause, and amendment by amendment, following the model
of Justice Story's Commentaries .161 Harlan rarely posed questions to
his students, and they seldom asked questions. Occasionally, he
would engage in a colloquy with a student, perhaps experimenting
with the Socratic approach. 169
Unsurprisingly, Harlan started his journey through the Constitu-
tion with a discussion of the Preamble and its purpose:
The purpose of the preamble to a statute is to state the
evils which it was proposed to remedy by the statute, as well
as the object for which the statute was enacted. So, the pre-
amble to the Constitution states what was the evil pre-ex-
isting and what was the remedy to be applied ....
That preamble does not contain any grant of power.170
As he began his discussion of each new article or section, he sum-
marized its general purpose. Article I: "Congress cannot organize any
other body in this country and invest it with legislative power, because
163 See, e.g., 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY & VICTOR H. LANE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 204 (7th ed. 1903) (discussing a Supreme Court of Michigan decision, written
by Cooley, as to the importance of the title of a statute).
164 See, e.g., JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
172-73 (1971) (citing 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 158 n.2 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833)) (describing a case in which Story "vigor-
ously" defended his original position twenty years later).
165 See generally Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1 (containing the twenty-seven lec-
tures delivered during the 1897-1898 term).
166 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
167 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 22-30 (Lecture No. 2, Oct. 21, 1897).
168 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 60.
169 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 288-90 (Lecture No. 23, Apr. 2,
1898).
170 Id. at 43 (Lecture No. 4, Oct. 30, 1897).
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this says all legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States, and that shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives."171 Article II: "The President does not
make a law. He has no more power to make a law than you have, but
he has power to execute it, to see that it is executed, not perhaps in
every way, but in the way prescribed by law." 17 2 Article III: "The judi-
cial power means the power which is called into existence to deter-
mine disputes between individuals or between individuals and
corporations, sometimes between states, and that power is vital to the
existence of society."173 And so he proceeded, through the Bill of
Rights, the amendments, all the way up to the most recently enacted
Fifteenth Amendment. 174
Despite lecturing without any notes, relying entirely on his mem-
ory, Harlan's lectures were very well organized and easy to under-
stand.175 Moreover, he often discussed particular cases in minute
detail, recounting their facts and even providing a citation. 176 More
often than not, Harlan's examples were cases in which he had written
the opinion or dissented.177 In addition, many of Harlan's hypotheti-
cals reflected the facts of cases he had decided.178
Harlan frequently posed rhetorical questions in order to explore
the meaning of a clause. For example, when discussing the President's
powers under Article II, he made the following comments:
[H]e shall take care that the laws of the United States are
faithfully executed.
Take care how? According to his arbitrary will, to do
whatever in his judgment may be necessary to that end? No,
because when he is executing the laws of the United States,
he must understand there are certain things he cannot do.179
While Harlan's students rarely asked questions, when they did, he
always answered them as fully and graciously as he could. If a stu-
171 Id. at 45.
172 Id. at 45-46.
173 Id. at 46.
174 See generally id.
175 See generally id.
176 See, e.g., id. at 79-81 (Lecture No. 7, Nov. 20, 1897) (describing a case Harlan decided
while riding circuit).
177 See, e.g., id.
178 See, e.g., id. at 89-90 (Lecture No. 8, Dec. 4, 1897) (using the facts of an actual U.S.
Supreme Court case as a hypothetical).
179 Id. at 230 (Lecture No. 19, Mar. 5, 1898).
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dent's question was unclear, Harlan would help refine or recast it.xso
Harlan's attentiveness to his students' questions reflected his humility.
When he did not know the answer to a question, he would admit his
ignorance, and return the following class with a complete answer.181
3. Harlan's Constitutional Law Exam
No law school course would be complete without an exam. Jus-
tice Harlan's examinations were rather straightforward, and many of
the questions were taken directly from his lectures. One question asks
"[w]hat does interstate commerce embrace," whether a state court can
"declare an act of Congress void as in violation of the Constitution of
the United States," and what is meant by "liberty" and "due process
of law" in the Constitution.182 In another exam, focusing on Article II,
he asks how the President is elected and what is the scope of the Presi-
dent's powers.183 In a question on the Courts, he asks his students
about how the judicial power is vested in the Constitution, and what is
the nature of the federal court's jurisdiction.184 Answering these ques-
tions requires no citation to any case law, though a student would
need to have memorized all of the clauses of the Constitution. Many
of these questions are exactly the same types of rhetorical questions
Harlan posed, and answered, in class.s85
Harlan also asked very specific questions, including "[w]hat are
direct taxes" and "[h]ow are [indirect taxes] to be levied."18 6 Harlan
discussed just this topic in lecture on February 5, 1898:
180 See, e.g., id. at 279 (Lecture No. 22, Mar. 26, 1898) (correcting a student's question
about practical nullification of a provision).
181 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 61 ("One student recalled years later that Harlan once
admitted to being unable to answer a question but promised to look it up: 'For one of the great-
est judges of the Supreme Court to avoid any degree of evasion, and to tell a class of greenhorns
that he was not positive as to the answer of one of their questions, naturally gave the students
confidence that anything he told them in the future would be a thing to be relied on."' (quoting
Letter from Almon C. Kellogg to Richard D. Harlan (May 27, 1930) (on file with The John
Marshall Harlan Collection, Univ. of Louisville))).
182 Exam May 25 (no year listed) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers,
supra note 2, at A2-67), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00277.
jpg (page 1), http://www.gwlr.orglwp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00278.jpg (page 2).
183 Exam (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-89,
93), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00360.jpg.
184 Exam (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-
97-98), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00368.jpg.
185 See, e.g., Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 310 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898).
186 Exam (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-
104-105), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00375.jpg.
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Now, if you want to find a discussion on the subject of what
are direct taxes, if you will look to the case of Pollock against
the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, at the close of 157
United States, and the same case in 158 United States, you
will find there all that the Supreme Court of the United
States, and each of its members, had occasion to say awhile
back upon an income tax.18 7
Of course, one of those members was Justice Harlan, who dis-
sented in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,1ss a 5-4 decision in
which the Supreme Court held that the Income Tax Act of 1894 im-
posed unapportioned direct taxes, and was unconstitutiona.189 In dis-
sent, Justice Harlan lamented that the Court "denie[d] to the general
government a power which is, or may become, vital to the very exis-
tence and preservation of the Union."190 Hopefully Harlan's students
paid attention in class, and knew how their instructor viewed this is-
sue. However, any answer to this question would soon become obso-
lete, as the Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913 in response to
Pollock, gave Congress the power to impose an income tax.191
It is interesting to compare this examination with Professor James
Bradley Thayer's constitutional law examination at the Harvard Law
School in 1898.192 Thayer's examination consisted of ten questions
and called for rather lengthy answers: "[t]hirty pages is a good maxi-
mum."193 Thayer's exam closely resembles a modern constitutional
law exam. He asked questions that required students to apply consti-
tutional concepts to novel scenarios, such as "[t]he State of Texas es-
tablishes, regulates, and taxes ferries between that State and Mexico
and Louisiana. May it lawfully do so? Why?"194 Similarly, he asked
whether "[a]n officer of volunteers mustered into the service of the
United States" who kills a bystander in Boston can "be punished con-
stitutionally in the local courts" or in the "[f]ederal courts."19 5
187 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 176 (Lecture No. 15, Feb. 5, 1898).
188 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
191 U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
192 James Bradley Thayer, Constitutional Law, in HARVARD UNIVERSITY EXAMINATIONS
37, 37-39 (1989). Thayer's other examinations are available at Harvard Law School: Annual
Examinations, 1871-1995, HARV. LIBR., http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLink?-col-
lection=oasis&uniqueld=1aw00237 (last visited May 29, 2013).
193 Thayer, supra note 192, at 37 (emphasis omitted).
194 Id. at 38.
195 Id. at 39.
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By contrast, Harlan's questions hewed closely to the text of the
Constitution. Unlike Thayer, Harlan asked questions that had defi-
nite answers and did not pose the open-ended questions that are com-
mon in modern constitutional law exams. Perhaps the structure of
Harlan's exam reflected his formalism. Harlan's approach to the Con-
stitution was textualist or originalist. According to him, all questions
of constitutional law could and should be answered by resorting to the
text and history of the Constitution.
D. The Supreme Court in the Classroom
Justice Harlan frequently infused his lectures with recent devel-
opments in the law, including cases he decided on the Supreme Court.
He often referred to the Supreme Court as "we": "We have said, that
is, the highest tribunal of the country has said . . ."196 More often
than not, he discussed cases in which he wrote the opinion. On one
occasion, he asked the students to read an opinion and remarked,
I have some little embarrassment in asking you to read the
case because I wrote the opinion, but as it is the only case
covering the precise ground that we have had in our court,
and as it has received the unanimous opinion of the court, I
therefore refer you to it.197
Harlan was coy about his dissents. According to one student, Jus-
tice Harlan "always got a good laugh when he would explain a major-
ity opinion of the Supreme Court and then outline his own sole
dissenting opinion . .. and after a sufficient pause, add: 'But of course
I was wrong.'"9 For example, when discussing Elk v. Wilkins 99 on
March 19, 1898, Harlan also displayed his wit, noting, "I had the mis-
fortune to differ from the Court upon that question, and of course I
was wrong." 2 00
Many of the current justices are considerably less humble, and
more certain of the correctness of their position, even when in dissent.
196 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 118 (Lecture No. 10, Dec. 18, 1897) (emphasis
added).
197 Id. at 97 (Lecture No. 8, Dec. 4, 1897).
198 BETH, supra note 39, at 186 (quoting Letter from Almon C. Kellogg to Richard D.
Harlan (May 27, 1930) (on file with The John Marshall Harlan Collection, Univ. of Louisville)).
199 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), superceded by statute, Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,
ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
200 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 266 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898); see also
id., at 310 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898) ("Now, presumably I am wrong, because I stood
alone, and the law must be held otherwise.") (discussing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538
(1884)).
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Regarding her dissenting view in Berghuis v. Thompkins,201 Justice
Sotomayor stated, "I do think I was right. I think the [majority was]
wrong." 20 2 In a common refrain about Bush v. Gore,203 Justice Scalia
simply says, "Get over it."204 Of his dissenting view in Bush v. Gore,
Justice Stevens said, "I don't question the good faith of the people, the
justices with whom I disagreed. But I think they were profoundly
wrong." 2 05 This is to say nothing of the so-called "perpetual dissents,"
where a Justice repeatedly takes the same position in dissent.206 JUS-
tice Breyer, who refused to accept the Court's landmark ruling in Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey,207 wrote two years later in Harris v. United States
that "I cannot yet accept its rule." 208 Likewise, Justices Black and
Douglas habitually dissented to every opinion upholding a federal ob-
scenity law, on the ground that they violated the First Amendment.209
Given Harlan's tendency to cite himself, even in dissent, it is not
surprising that The Great Dissenter did not dwell on his losses.
Harlan often used his own opinions to teach various doctrines and
subjects of constitutional law. In addition to assigning his own opin-
ion in Field v. Clark,2 10 he taught or recommended many of his own
opinions. For example, on January 29, 1898, he lectured on the Migra-
tion and Habeas Clauses of Article I, Section 9.211 At the end of the
lecture Harlan asked his students to read three cases to supplement
what he had already told them212: Ex Parte Royall,213 New York v.
Eno 214 and Robb v. Connolly.215 He neglected to mention that he had
201 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2266-78 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
202 Felisa Cardona, Stubborn Side Has Helped Justice Prevail, DENV. POST, Aug. 27, 2010,
at Al.
203 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
204 Bill Mears, Scalia Dismisses Talk of Internal Court Rancor, CNN (July 19, 2012, 10:07
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/19/us/scalia-morgan-interview/index.html.
205 Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens Opens Up, CBSNEws (Dec. 5, 2010, 9:13 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-7082572.html.
206 Allison Orr Larsen, Essay, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 447, 451 (2008).
207 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 569 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). See generally Larsen, supra note 206 (noting Justice Breyer's fre-
quent dissents in Sixth Amendment, sovereign immunity, and Commerce Clause cases).
209 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (raising First Amendment concerns, citing three previous concur-
rences by Justice Black and one dissent and one concurrence by Justice Douglas).
210 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 97 (Lec-
ture No. 8, Dec. 4, 1897).
211 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 163-73 (Lecture No. 14, Jan. 29, 1898).
212 Id. at 173.
213 Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (Harlan, J.).
214 New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894) (Harlan, J.).
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written all three opinions.216 Harlan frequently discussed several cases
he participated in deciding, including United States v. Ballin,217 In re
Medley218 (a case dealing with the Ex Post Facto Clause) and In re
Neagle.219
Justice Harlan sometimes took advantage of opportunities to re-
late personal anecdotes about cases in which he had participated. In
discussing Congress's exclusive authority to legislate for the District of
Columbia, he told the class of an exchange he had with counsel during
argument that had surprised him.2 20 In Callan v. Wilson,221 the gov-
ernment had argued that Congress could suspend the right to a trial
by jury in criminal cases, and, according to Justice Harlan, went so far
as to say that Congress need not consider the protections of the Bill of
Rights when legislating for the District.222 Justice Harlan and the
Court disagreed: "We held in that case . . . that the power given to
215 Robb v. Conolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884) (Harlan, J.).
216 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 173 (Lecture No. 14, Jan. 29, 1898); see
also, e.g., id. at 129 (Lecture No. 11, Jan. 8, 1898) (discussing, among other cases, N.Y., New
Haven & Hartford R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1897) (Harlan, J.)).
217 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); see Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at
90-91 (Lecture No. 8, Dec. 4, 1897).
218 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890); see Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 175
(Lecture No. 15, Feb. 5, 1898) ("When an offense was committed in the state where that particu-
lar one was committed, there was no such thing as solitary confinement as a part of the punish-
ment for any length of time, but by the time that man was tried there was a statute of the state
which provided for solitary confinement from the time of conviction until the execution, and the
question was whether that was ex post facto. Did that add to the man's punishment; did it
increase the punishment? A majority of our court held that it did . . . .").
219 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (affirming the circuit court's grant of the writ of habeas
corpus by a six to two vote; Justice Harlan being in the majority, and Justice Field taking no part
in the case); see Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 232 (Lecture No. 19, March 5, 1898)
("The case is entitled In re Neagle, 135 United States, page 1, opinion by Mr. Justice Miller. I
may repeat here what I have stated to you often: that you will derive great profit in understand-
ing the Constitution of the United States in the study of great cases. And if you study that case
you will then understand as you have not understood before the full scope of this constitutional
requirement that the President of the United States shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.").
220 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 156 (Lecture No. 13, Jan. 22, 1898) ("No
doubt the thought will occur to you, what may Congress do in this district? How far may it go?
Well, that is an important question. It is easily answered, however, although I have heard argu-
ments made upon that subject that a little surprised me at the time.").
221 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
222 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 156-58 (Lecture No. 13, Jan. 22, 1898); see
also Callan, 127 U.S. at 548 ("The contention of the government is, that the Constitution does
not require that the right of trial by jury shall be secured to the people of the District of Colum-
bia; . . . that, in adopting the Sixth Amendment, the people of the States were solicitous about
trial by jury in the States and nowhere else, leaving it entirely to Congress to declare in what way
persons should be tried who might be accused of crime on the high seas, and in the District of
Columbia .... ).
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Congress to pass exclusive legislation over this District meant that
that legislation must be considered with reference to the fundamental
provisions of the Constitution." 2 23 This continues Harlan's theme of
extending the protections of the Bill of Rights to the states, and in-
deed the federal District of Columbia.
E. Harlan's Untimely Departure from Columbian College of Law
Today, law schools are so desirous of having Supreme Court Jus-
tices speak at their campuses-let alone teach-that they fete their
guests with every conceivable honor upon their arrival. Justice Harlan
did not receive such royal treatment. In fact, he was treated rather
crudely by Columbian, and his departure from the law school was ab-
rupt, to say the least.
During the summer of 1910, Ernest G. Lorenzen, Dean of the
Department of Law at George Washington University,224 wrote to
Harlan, who at the time was vacationing in Canada, informing him
that the faculty decided that the professors would personally contrib-
ute funds to pay the salary of the secretary for the law department
over the summer, and the amount contributed was to be returned in
the fall after tuition fees were received. 225 Harlan replied, noting that
he was not consulted about this matter, admittedly because he was out
of the country, and agreed to pay his share of $56.40, provided that
"any further demands upon [him] should be made known in ad-
vance." 2 2 6 Harlan noted that his salary over the past year at the Uni-
versity was diminished, and his."means are very limited." 227
Five days after Dean Lorenzen mailed the letter to Harlan, Wal-
ter Clephane, a former student-who went on to participate in seven-
teen cases before the Supreme Court from 1909 (while Harlan was
still on the Court) through 1942 228-wrote to Harlan.22 9 Clephane,
223 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 157 (Lecture No. 13, Jan. 22, 1898).
224 For an example of Lorenzen's work, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Validity of Wills,
Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in the Conflict of Laws, 20 YALE L.J. 427 (1911).
225 Letter from Ernest G. Lorenzen to John Marshall Harlan (June 22, 1910) (on file with
the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-126), available at http://www.
gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00397.jpg.
226 Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Ernest G. Lorenzen (June 24, 1910) (on file with
the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-127), available at http://www.
gwir.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00398.jpg.
227 Id.
228 Penn. Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 315 U.S. 806 (1942); Walker v. Hazen,
302 U.S. 723, 723 (1937); Feiffer v. Mann, 296 U.S. 587 (1935); Allen v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 572
(1934); McGovern v. Hitt, 290 U.S. 637 (1933); Wash. Fidelity Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Burton, 287 U.S.
97, 97 (1932); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 192 (1932); Jewell v. Graham, 277 U.S. 596 (1928);
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who was asked to assist the interim dean, noted the "critical [condi-
tion of the University] from a financial standpoint." 230 As it stood,
professors would only be paid one-half of their salary during the year,
and the balance would be paid at the end of the year, if the tuition
fees received "warrant[ed] it."231 Acknowledging the benefit and
prestige the Justice brought to the school, Clephane was concerned
that Harlan "might not feel that [he] could afford to give the neces-
sary time to the University upon the basis of this reduced compensa-
tion."232 Dean Lorenzen wrote two days later that due to the financial
difficulties, the school lowered the requirement for a Bachelor of
Laws degree from forty-two hours to thirty-six hours.233 As a result,
Harlan's constitutional law class was shortened to "two hours for the
first semester only," and his salary was reduced by half to $1500.234
Lorenzen also notified Harlan, repeating what Clephane wrote, that
the faculty would only receive one-half of their salaries each month,
with the remainder to be paid at the end of the year.235
Harlan replied to Lorenzen on June 25, and sought clarification
about the nature of his compensation, asking whether the school
would keep the tuition fees separate from the general treasury of the
University, because otherwise there was a chance that "nothing
[would be] left in the treasury to pay the last half of [his] salary." 236
Paddon v. Paddon, 268 U.S. 702 (1925); Charles J. Webb & Co., v. Pingree Cattle Loan Co., 264
U.S. 570, 570 (1924); Lancaster v. Fitch, 262 U.S. 754 (1923); Dahn v. Davis, 258 U.S. 421, 421
(1922); Crutchley v. Nat'l Fireproofing Co., 241 U.S. 664, 664 (1916); Kansas City S. R. Co. v.
Guardian Trust Co., 240 U.S. 166, 170 (1916); Taylor v. Columbian Univ., 226 U.S. 126, 130
(1912); Trussed Concrete Steel Co. v. Fidelity Storage Corp., 225 U.S. 716 (1912); Crook v. Int'l
Trust Co. of Md., 215 U.S. 613, 613 (1909).
229 Letter from Walter Clephane to John Marshall Harlan (June 25, 1910) (on file with the
Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-128-130), available at http://www.
gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00399.jpg.
230 Id.
231 Id. at A2-129, available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00400.
jpg.
232 Id.
233 Letter from Ernest G. Lorenzen to John Marshall Harlan (June 27, 1910) (on file with
the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-133), available at http://www.
gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00404.jpg.
234 Id.; see also Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Walter Clephane (June 28, 1910) (on
file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-137), available at http://
www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00408.jpg.
235 Letter from Ernest G. Lorenzen to John Marshall Harlan (June 27, 1910), supra note
233.
236 Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Ernest G. Lorenzen (June 28, 1910) (on file with
the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-136), available at http://www.
gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00407.jpg.
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Respectful, though upset, Harlan considered "the whole matter [to
be] so serious," that he would write later regarding this matter. 23 7
Harlan replied to Clephane, noting that he "must ask time to con-
sider" the reduction in salary and asking Clephane for clarification
about the length of his constitutional law class prior to responding to
the Dean.238
Lorenzen replied to Harlan on June 30, clarified how Harlan
would be paid, and assured Harlan that he would ultimately receive
his full salary after all tuition fees were received. 2 39  On July 1,
Clephane wrote to Harlan, and explained that the L.L.B. degree was
shortened from a four-year program to a three-year program, and
many courses were shortened, with others eliminated completely.240
Harlan then received a check for one-half of his July salary on July 5,
1910.241 Harlan replied to Clephane, and informed him that he would
make his decision in about ten days' time.24 2 Harlan's son, James,
wrote to him on July 19, 1910, and objected to the university "getting
[his] services at [his] time of life for a beggarly compensation." 24 3 He
urged his father not to consent to the reduction in salary, insisting that
unpaid back salary should be paid up, and that he set the terms of his
employment. 244 James Harlan refused to allow Snow, the President of
the University, and his "termagant wife (who [James thought was]
crazy)" to prescribe the terms of the Justice's employment.245 James
237 Id.
238 Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Walter Clephane (June 28, 1910) (on file with the
Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2137), available at http://www.gwlr.
orglwp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00408.jpg.
239 Letter from Ernest G. Lorenzen to John Marshall Harlan (June 30, 1910) (on file with
the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-139-40), available at http://
www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00411.jpg.
240 Letter from Walter Clephane to John Marshall Harlan (July 1, 1910) (on file with the
Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-142), available at http://www.gwlr.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00413.jpg.
241 Letter from Charles F. Holmes, Treasurer, George Washington Univ., to John Marshall
Harlan (July 5, 1910) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at
A2-144), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00415.jpg.
242 Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Walter Clephane (July 8, 1910) (on file with the
Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-145), available at http://www.gwlr.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00416.jpg.
243 Letter from James Harlan to John Marshall Harlan (July 19, 1910) (on file with the
Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-146), available at http://www.gwkr.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00417.jpg.
244 Id.
245 Id. at A2-147-148, available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC004
18.jpg.
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Harlan advised his father to insist on his prior salary of $4,000, which
he had earned several years prior.246
Harlan wrote to Dean Lorenzen on July 23, notifying him that he
would not resume working at the University in the fall.2 4 7 In response,
A. B. Browne, a trustee of the University, replied, and characterized
Harlan's departure as a retirement, noting that "it is both wise and
just for you to husband your strength."248 Such chutzpah to a Justice
today would be beyond unimaginable. Harlan took great exception to
this misrepresentation, and replied that his resignation was not due to
his health, but because his "surroundings had become very disagreea-
ble." 249 Harlan reported that Snow, the President of the University,
"had without cause become hostile to every member of [his] family
and to [himself]."250 Harlan claimed that Mrs. Snow was "writing un-
friendly letters about [the Harlans] in many directions" and Mr. Snow
knew about these actions but "failed to control her."251 Harlan attrib-
uted the reduction of his salary, as well as the withholding of his son's
salary following his resignation, to Mr. Snow's hostilities.2 52
Harlan replied to Clephane, noting that his health permitted him
to continue teaching, though due to "most disagreeable circum-
stances" he resigned from the University.253 In this letter, Harlan shed
light on the conflict between the Snows and the Harlans. Mrs. Snow
was a cousin of Mrs. Harlan, and imagined that the Harlans desired to
"patronize" her and her husband. 254 Harlan contended that this was a
delusion. 255 As a result, Mrs. Snow stopped coming to the Harlan
246 Id. at A2-148, available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00419.
8pg.
247 This letter was not in the library's collection, but its content can be derived from the
letter sent in response on July 26, 1910. See Letter from A. B. Browne to John Marshall Harlan
(July 26, 1910) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-
150), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00421.jpg.
248 Id.
249 Letter from John Marshall Harlan to A. B. Browne (July 29, 1910) (on file with the
Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-151), available at http://www.gwlr.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00422.jpg.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. Harlan's son, Richard Davenport Harlan, was the President of Lake Forest College
in Illinois from 1901-1905, when he "left for Washington, D.C., to do administrative work at
George Washington University." HARLAN, supra note 117, at insert.
253 John Marshall Harlan to Walter Clephane (July 29, 1910) (on file with the Library of
Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-151a), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00423.jpg.
254 Id.
255 Id.
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house, and spoke ill of the family "everywhere." 256 Mr. and Mrs.
Snow, Harlan contended, "intended to make war upon a Lecturer in
the University who had served it for nearly twenty years." 257 Harlan's
departure was finalized on September 12, 1910, when the Justice
mailed his formal resignation to the Board of Trustees of George
Washington University. 258
The chronology of these correspondences coincides with a very
significant and unexpected event on the Court. Chief Justice Fuller
passed away on July 4, 1910.259 Following the death of Chief Justice
Fuller, "John Harlan, as senior associate, acted as chief justice." 2 60
Contemporaneously with his letters to the Dean of the law school and
others, he sent several important communiqu6s to President Taft and
Justice Day about the successor to the Chief Justiceship. 261 There was
even some talk about Justice Harlan being promoted to the Chief Jus-
tice position.2 62 Perhaps his willingness to resign the job he loved so
much was spurred by his desire to be Chief Justice, although this is
unlikely, as Harlan himself admitted that he was probably too old for
the position. 263 Further, the conditions at George Washington Univer-
sity had become so uncomfortable, it is fairly clear that this was his
true motivation for leaving the University. Remarkably, despite the
tumult of the death of the Chief Justice, Harlan was able to communi-
256 Id.
257 Id. at A2-153, available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00424.
jpg.
258 Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Board of Trustees, George Washington Univ.
(September 12, 1910) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at
A2-158), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00430.jpg.
259 BETH, supra note 39, at 185.
260 Id. ("During the rest of the summer the work would not have amounted to a great deal,
but Harlan undoubtedly had to be in Washington ahead of his colleagues in September in order
to make sure the cases were properly scheduled and everything was ready for the coming
session.")
261 Read & Berman, supra note 10, at 61 (citing Letters, John Marshall Harlan to William
Howard Taft (July 11, 1910); John Marshall Harlan to William R. Day (July 22, 1910); William R.
Day to John Marshall Harlan (July 25, 1910)) ("There is an exchange of letters in 1910 about
Harlan's recommendation to President Taft that Justice William R. Day be made Chief Justice
following the death of Chief Justice Fuller.").
262 Id. at 61 n.15 ("There are letters and clippings indicating a mild campaign on Harlan's
behalf for the position."); see also Letter from Henry B. F. MacFarland to John Marshall Harlan
(Aug. 2, 1910) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A-2
157), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00428.jpg ("As I said to
your son some weeks ago, I wish very much that the president would make you Chief Justice of
the United States. I believe that appointment would gratify not only your innumerable personal
friends but the whole country.").
263 In his letter to Day, Harlan says, "My years forbid [the President's] consideration of my
name, even if he had no other objections." Read & Berman, supra note 10, at 61 n.15.
[Vol. 81:10631094
JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN
cate promptly and effectively regarding his position at the school,
stressing how significant that job was to him. Only after ten days of
deliberation did he officially decide to resign.26 4 This is a testament to
his reasonableness and desire for deliberative thought.
F. Origin of the Lecture Notes
During the 1897-1898 term at the Columbian College of Law,
Harlan taught a yearlong constitutional law class. That term, two of
Harlan's students decided to practice their shorthand by recording all
of his lectures verbatim.2 65 Both students recorded each lecture in
shorthand. After comparing their notes, they made a typewritten
transcript of each lecture, as well as a letterpress copy on Japanese
paper. 266 At the end of the term, they had transcribed about 500 pages
of lectures.
One of the two students was George Johannes, an eighteen-year-
old clerk in the Government Printing Office. 267 Johannes was born in
Chicago in 1879, and started working at the Government Printing Of-
fice in 1894, at the age of fifteen.2 68 He eventually graduated from
Columbian College of Law, earning a Master of Laws, and joined the
bar of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 269 Johannes
remained in government service for many years, rising through the
ranks of the Department of Commerce and the Labor and the Census
Bureau.270
264 Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Walter Clephane (July 29, 2010), supra note 253.
265 Letter from George Johannes to John Marshall Harlan (Oct. 21, 1955), supra note 2.
266 Id. Japanese paper is a very fine, acid-free, semitransparent mesh paper. About Washi,
THE JAPANESE PAPER PLACE, http://www.japanesepaperplace.com/abt-japanese-paper/about-
washi.htm (last visited May 30, 2013). A letterpress copy is a mechanical copy of an ink docu-
ment, made by dampening the document with water, placing it on a piece of thin paper, and
pressing the two together with a hand press. Letterpress copies were common from the seven-
teenth to the early twentieth centuries. James T. Currie, Letter to the Editor, Before
Photocopiers, Before Carbons: Letterpress Copies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2012), http://
chronicle.com/article/Before-Photocopiers-Before/134756/.
267 Johannes Takes Place of Soleau, WASH. HERALD, Aug. 23, 1911, at 2.
268 Id.
269 Id. Presumably, Johannes also earned a Bachelor of Laws. In 1898, Columbian College
of Law offered a Bachelor of Laws, which required two years of study, as well as a Master of
Laws, which appears to have required an additional year of study. See Probing the Law School's
Past, supra note 77.
270 George Johannes Promoted, WASH. HERALD, Oct. 19, 1909, at 5; Items, General and
Personal, of Interest to G.P.O. Workers, WASH. HERALD, Oct. 24, 1909, at 8; Johannes Takes
Place of Soleau, supra note 267; Geo. Johannes Promoted, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1917, at 3.
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Eventually, he went into private practice, joining the Washington,
D.C. firm Irelan and Mollohan.271 Johannes was counsel of record in
several cases before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, win-
ning appeals before some legendary circuit judges. In Ramseur v.
Thompson,27 2 a panel consisting of then-circuit judges Warren E. Bur-
ger (future Chief Justice) and David Bazelon affirmed per curiam his
favorable ruling before the district court. 273 Burger would have "dis-
missed the appeal as frivolous." 274 In Major v. Shaver,275 a per curiam
panel that included Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, ruled in Johannes's
favor, and reversed the lower court.276 Professor Harlan taught his
student well.
On October 28, 1955, Johannes sent his letterpress copy of the
lectures to Harlan's grandson at the Supreme Court, the second Jus-
tice John Marshall Harlan.277 The second Justice Harlan eventually
donated Johannes's letterpress copy of the lectures in the Library of
Congress.
III. HARLAN'S JURISPRUDENCE
Harlan's lectures provide a unique perspective into his under-
standing of the Constitution. Unlike his opinions, his lectures are in-
formal, digressive, and personal. As a compendium to this Article, we
have also published an annotated transcript of all twenty-seven lec-
tures.2 78 This Section focuses on how Harlan's lectures illuminate his
views about the foundation of the United States Constitution, the role
history should play in its construction, and how he viewed equal pro-
tection, due process, citizenship, and notions of freedom of speech,
religious liberty, economic liberty, and gender equality.
271 Letter from George Johannes to John Marshall Harlan (Oct. 21, 1955), supra note 2.
272 Ramseur v. Thompson, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
273 Id. at 458.
274 Id. (Burger, J., concurring).
275 Major v. Shaver, 187 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (per curiam).
276 Id. at 213.
277 Letter from George Johannes to John Marshall Harlan (Oct. 21, 1955), supra note 2;
Letter from John Marshall Harlan to George Johannes (Oct. 27, 1955) (on file with the Library
of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-3), available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00477.jpg; Letter from John Marshall Harlan to George Johannes
(Oct. 28, 1955) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note 2, at A2-4),
available at http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/DSC00478.jpg. Presumably, Johan-
nes kept the letterpress copy and his unidentified friend kept the original.
278 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1.
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A. Proto-Originalist
Long before Justices Black or Scalia, Harlan advocated a theory
of constitutional interpretation that resembles modern day original-
ism. As he put it:
Now, it is essential to a clear understanding of our Con-
stitution to know something of the circumstances under
which those who framed it were placed. There are words in
our Constitution which are susceptible of different construc-
tions, but their meanings are ascertained by knowing the cir-
cumstances which then existed and the laws and customs
which went before. We ought to know what principles of
government existed at the time and before that time, what
right of life, liberty, or property existed and which went
before the time when the colonies achieved their indepen-
dence. Every lawyer knows that the meaning of a rule of law
is best ascertained by taking the history of the rule, back
through the line of legislation and adjudications, up to the
time when it was first enacted. 27 9
According to Harlan, the meaning of the Constitution is informed
by its history, leaving "little or no scope for originality" of interpreta-
tion.280 To Harlan, originalism did not provide for "originality." To
understand the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause, Harlan asked, "When this Constitution was adopted, what did
commerce mean?" 281 For Harlan, the meaning of "due process" is de-
termined by asking, "[W]hat was due process of law at the time when
the Constitution was adopted?" 282 Harlan concluded that due process
protected every common law right guaranteed at ratification, as speci-
fied in the Bill of Rights. 28 3 A judgment cannot be rendered against a
party not notified of suit. 284 Government cannot take property for
public use without notice or compensation, or for private use in any
circumstances. 28 5 A prosecution on an information rather than an in-
279 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 15 (Lecture No. 1, Oct. 14, 1897).
280 Id. at 14.
281 Id. at 118 (Lecture No. 10, Dec. 18, 1897); cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although I join the majority, I write separately to observe that
our case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. In a
future case, we ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both
makes sense of our more recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of
that Clause.").
282 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 344 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
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dictment is void, as is a prosecution in secret session or without as-
signed counsel.2 86 This is the "basis of Anglo-Saxon liberty." 28 7
Harlan placed great importance on understanding the history of
English common law, the founding documents, and what the Constitu-
tion meant to the Framers. Harlan's first lecture of the term, deliv-
ered on October 14, 1897, presents his theory of constitutional
jurisprudence in a nutshell.288 By comparing the English and Ameri-
can systems of government, Harlan tried to identify the elements of
American constitutionalism that make it unique.2 89 He emphasized
that the strength of American government is its stability, created "be-
cause in our fundamental law we have placed checks upon
ourselves. "290
According to Harlan, the judge represents "the majesty of the
law, and that law is above everybody." 291 And for him, that is the key
feature of American constitutionalism.292 Unlike any other country in
the world, in America, any judge, even a justice of the peace, can de-
clare a law unconstitutional and void.2 93 Then Harlan recounts the
history of the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution. They
first came into being with the Magna Carta, and were extended by the
English Bill of Rights and the Writ of Habeas Corpus.2 94 Harlan lec-
tured to his class about the Magna Carta, and remarked, "in the his-
tory of all the Anglo-Saxon race, and many other races, . . . it is the
lawyer that has stepped forward and has put himself in the way of
arbitrary power to defend the rights of man."295 These were the fun-
damental rights at issue in the American Revolution. 29 6 In England,
Parliament can destroy these fundamental rights by repealing the stat-
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 14-21 (Lecture No. 1, Oct. 14, 1897).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 19
291 Id. at 259 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898). A century later, Justice O'Connor wrote a
book by the same title. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW (Craig Joyce, ed.,
2003).
292 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 259-60 (Lecture No. 2, Oct. 21, 1897).
293 Id. at 260.
294 Id. at 260-61.
295 Id. at 23 (Lecture No. 2, Oct. 21, 1897).
296 Id. at 28-29.
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ute that provides them.297 By contrast, the Constitution can only be
amended by the people;298 Congress cannot alter it on its own.299
Harlan was an unabashed admirer of the Federalist Papers. "[I]f
you have not got [The Federalist] in your library I advise you to look
tomorrow in the secondhand bookstores and see if you cannot buy
one for half price, for it is worth its weight in gold."300 Harlan's enthu-
siasm for The Federalist is matched by modern originalists. For exam-
ple, Justice Scalia is a great admirer. At a recent seminar, Scalia urged
members of Congress to obtain a copy of The Federalist.301 One at-
tendee said, "He [Justice Scalia] said we should all get a copy of the
Federalist Papers and read it, underline it and dog-ear it."302
Harlan's devotion to the Constitution as he understood it was
steadfast. He hoped to convey "safe and sound thoughts about our
National Government and the Constitution under which it was organ-
ized." 03 On the anniversary of Justice Harlan's twenty-fifth year on
the court, Justice Brewer said, "Every man has his hobby, and my
brother Harlan has as his judicial hobby the Constitution. He has be-
lieved that the Constitution and the flag are one now and forever. He
has never believed that it was a rope of sand or a cord of rubber."3 0
Harlan's lectures make his passion for the Constitution palpable. On
one occasion, after reading the Supremacy Clause, he said, "I love to
read these clauses. Let me read one more before we close."305
Some have referred to Harlan as "the last Whig justice."306 There
is some truth to that assessment of his jurisprudence. While Harlan
believed that the law should change, he believed that it should change
in an orderly fashion, through the legal process, according to tradi-
297 Id. at 260-61 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898). For example, in 2005, Parliament re-
pealed the "double jeopardy" protection for criminal defendants. See Owen Bowcott, Stephen
Lawrence Murder Retrial Due to Double Jeopardy Repeal, GUARDIAN (May 18, 2011, 9:09 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/may/18/double-jeopardy-stephen-lawrence-suspect.
298 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 296 (Lecture No. 23, Apr. 2, 1898).
299 Id.
300 Id. at 237 (Lecture No. 19, Mar. 5, 1898).
301 Henry C. Jackson, Justice Scalia: Lawmakers Need to Get Familiar with Federalist Pa-
pers, HUFF POST POLITICS (Jan. 24, 2011, 10:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/24/
scalia-tea-party-n813472.html (quoting Representative Jan Schakowsky).
302 Id.
303 BETH, supra note 39, at 187 (quoting Letter from John Marshall Harlan to Walter
Clephane (Aug. 4, 1910) (on file with the Library of Congress, The Harlan Papers, supra note
2)).
304 Justice Harlan at 70, WASH. PosT, June 2, 1903, at 13.
305 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 297 (Lecture No. 23, Apr. 2, 1898).
306 See BETH, supra note 39.
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tional rules. 307 However, he did not merely express the nationalist,
unionist positions of the only American Whig Party. 308 When he be-
came a Republican, Harlan adopted some of his new party's latent
radicalism. 309 Yet his version of abolitionism and the Fourteenth
Amendment drew on the radical Whig theories of the American
Revolution.310 His was an ancient, not a modern, Constitution.31 1 As
he put it, one should not "accept blindly what the fathers have taught
but you ought to be slow in striking down the old landmarks, or
ploughing up the old ways." 312
B. American Exceptionalism and Providence
In his lectures, Justice Harlan expressed a strong belief in Ameri-
can exceptionalism and in the role of providence in America's suc-
cess.313 He saw a tight connection between the rule of law and
religion, and considered them both essential to America's prosper-
ity.3 14 For Harlan, constitutional liberty consisted of the common law
rights of Englishmen, secured by the Constitution and realized by the
Court. 31 5 The primary merit of a written Constitution was to render
immutable traditional common law rights.316 And those common law
rights were secured and realized only by special providences, indelibly
marked by blood and fire. 317 Harlan argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states.3 18 He
believed that the Constitution expressed the "providential" purpose
of the United States.319 Discussing the clause that requires that of-
ficers must swear to uphold the Constitution, Harlan asks, "Is there
any country on the Earth that has in its statutes or laws a provision
like that? Not one." 320
307 See id. at 268-69.
308 See id. at 3, 86.
309 See id. at 86.
310 See id. at 3.
311 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 14-15 (Lecture No. 1, Oct. 14, 1897).
312 BETH, supra note 39, at 150 (quoting Letter from John Marshall Harlan to James S.
Harlan (Sept. 15, 1880) (on file with The John Marshall Harlan Collection, Univ. of Louisville)).
313 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 264 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898); id. at
283 (Lecture No. 23, Apr. 2, 1898).
314 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 58.
315 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 20-21 (Lecture No. 1, Oct. 14, 1897); id. at
257-60 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
316 See id. at 257 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
317 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 48.
318 BETH, supra note 39, at 218.
319 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 62.
320 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 297 (Lecture No. 23, Apr. 2, 1898).
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Praising the values of the separation of powers, Harlan taught:
A government and the only one on the Earth where the
heads of it and all the branches of it are governed by a writ-
ten instrument that says, thus far you may go and no farther,
that says to one branch of the government, you may handle
this subject, to another, you may handle these subjects, to
another branch, you may do this. But it says to all that the
law for you and for every human being in this country is this
written instrument, which is a power of attorney from the
people of the United States to this government. 32 1
Harlan even viewed the dreaded Dred Scott decision as:
[A] sort of special providence to this country, in that it laid
the foundation of a civil war which, terrible as it was, awful
as it was in its consequences in the loss of life and money,
was in the end a blessing to this country in that it rid us of the
institution of African slavery. That case was the beginning of
that struggle.322
Harlan revered the founders, especially George Washington, of
whom he stated:
We are apt to think, and very rightly, that if it had not
been for George Washington, we would not have had the
country we now have. We style him "The Father of the
Country," and he was. I believe we owe more to him for the
adoption of the present form of government than any man of
his day. He was not trained in statesmanship, but he had
what we may call saving common sense. He was raised up, if
there is such a thing as a special providence, to save this
country. So far as we now see and can judge, there was no
other man of that day that could have led our armies and
kept up their courage to the spirit of independence that he
did.32 3
Harlan also admired Alexander Hamilton. Marveling at how
much Hamilton accomplished at such a young age, he remarked,
"[W]henever a great crisis came upon any people, Providence was
kind enough to raise up the man to meet the emergency." 324 Harlan
also included Jefferson, Lincoln, and Grant in his list of providential
American leaders:
321 Id. at 41 (Lecture No. 3, Oct. 23, 1897) (emphasis added).
322 Id. at 264 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898) (emphasis added).
323 Id. at 111-12 (Lecture No. 9, Dec. 11, 1897) (emphasis added).
324 Id. at 239 (Lecture No. 19, Mar. 5, 1898) (emphasis added).
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We sometimes are in the habit in our ordinary conversa-
tion of speaking of particular things which have occurred as
providences: "That was a special providence." We say that
George Washington was a special providence, that he was
raised up for the work he did, and that no other man could
have done the work-so far as we can tell-that he did. We
say that Jefferson was a special providence, and that no other
man could have performed the work that he did. We talk in
the same way about Abraham Lincoln, and about Ulysses S.
Grant in the same sense.325
At the conclusion of the last lecture, on May 7, 1898, three weeks
after Congress declared war on Spain, Justice Harlan stressed the
power of American exceptionalism:
If the world never knew so before [of America's prowess],
they have been convinced within the last fortnight that this
great republic of ours, in all the future destinies of the world,
is to be reckoned with in the government of European af-
fairs. And that the power on this Earth today that is likely to
shape the destinies of Europe and the Far Eastern countries,
and of the whole human race in the next century, are the
United States of America.326
Like many Americans of his day, Harlan deeply believed that
America represented the world's best hope for liberty and justice.
Harlan's republicanism committed him to popular sovereignty,
civic virtue, and self-governance. Other Justices saw the rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution as abstract, derived from reason and prac-
ticality. For some, like Holmes and Brandeis, it meant legal realism.327
By contrast, Harlan saw constitutional rights as elements of a shared
culture, and the extension of them to the states through the Constitu-
tion as a means of promoting and preserving national unity. By af-
firming a common American heritage, rooted in "Anglo-Saxon"
liberties, the Court, through the Bill of Rights and the constitutional
privileges and immunities it protected, could help create a unified na-
tion, one with the ideological strength to overcome sectional and ra-
cial differences.328 Harlan's lectures were one tool for accomplishing
this goal.
325 Id. at 264 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898) (emphasis added).
326 Id. at 347 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898) (emphasis added).
327 See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 1881); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
328 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 15 (Lecture No. 1, Oct. 14, 1897).
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C. American Citizenship and Equal Protection
One of Harlan's most passionate lectures was his discussion of
United States v. Wong Kim Ark 32 9 on March 19, 1898.330 In Wong Kim
Ark, the Supreme Court considered whether birth in the United
States was sufficient to grant United States citizenship to a person of
Chinese descent.3 31 The Court, in a 6-2 decision by Justice Gray, held
that Wong Kim Ark, who was born in the United States to Chinese
citizens, acquired American citizenship at birth by the principle of jus
soli. 3 32 Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented, argu-
ing for the principle of jus sanguinis, under which a child inherits citi-
zenship from his or her father, regardless of birthplace. 33
Wong Kim Ark was argued on March 5 and 8, 1897.334 When
Harlan discussed it in class on March 19, 1898, he expressed views
closely reflecting the dissent he eventually joined.335 Harlan argued
that Chinese-Americans could not be assimilated into the American
populace, and thus were not entitled to birthright citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 3 6 The case would be decided nine days
later on March 28, 1898, after which Harlan explained how he recon-
ciled his views with those of the majority.337 This discussion illumi-
nates Harlan's chimerical views on race, and juxtaposes his
enlightened dissents in Plessy v. Ferguson 33 and the Civil Rights
Cases33 9 with his xenophobic views in Wong Kim Ark.
1. A Preview of Wong Kim Ark in Class
Harlan was quite passionate, and certain, about his views on
birthright citizenship. During his lecture on March 19, 1898, Justice
Harlan had just finished discussing the importance of Dred Scott in
bringing about the end of slavery when he considered birthright citi-
zenship for three classes of people-the son of a freedman, an Indian,
and a "Chinaman." 34 0 Justice Harlan used this pending case as a vehi-
329 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
330 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 266 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
331 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 653.
332 Id. at 652, 667, 705.
333 Id. at 732 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
334 Id. at 649.
335 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 266-68 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
336 Id.
337 Id. at 342-43 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
338 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
339 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
340 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 266-68 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
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cle to discuss Congress's Article I power to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization and whether the Fourteenth Amendment curtailed
"Congress['s] [power] to establish a uniform rule of naturalization." 34 1
A child of "African descent" is born in Tennessee, Harlan hy-
pothesized, and his "father was before him, freed by the Thirteenth
Amendment, [and] made a freeman." 342 Would the child be a citizen?
Now, that man, whatever Tennessee may think about him,
however much she may grumble about it-if she
does . . .- that man is not only a citizen of the United States,
but he is a citizen of the state of Tennessee, because he was
born in the United States, and born subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States.34 3
But "Judge," a student interjects, "does that include Indians?" 344
The answer: "No." 34 5 Harlan cited the "very learned opinion .. . by
the majority of the Court" 34 6 in Elk v. Wilkins,347 in which an Indian,
born on a reservation, "left his tribe and came into the state of Ne-
braska, intending to become a part of that people." 348 The Court
"thought that he could not become a citizen of the United States." 34 9
Harlan, who did not join that "learned opinion," "had the misfortune
to differ from the Court upon that question, and of course [he] was
wrong."350 Harlan would have found someone born on an Indian res-
ervation to be a citizen of the United States.351
Would a Chinaman born in this country be a citizen?
We have now before us under consideration this case,
and when I tell you the case you will probably understand
why I cannot answer your question, as it has not been de-
cided. It will be decided some of these days. 3 52
Nonetheless, Harlan proceeded to give his views on the topic.
Harlan described the facts of the case, wherein "a subject of the Em-
peror of China . . . [gave birth to] a male child." 3 5 3 Wong Kim Ark,
341 Id. at 266.
342 Id. at 265.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
348 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 259 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
349 Id.
350 Id. at 266
351 See id.
352 Id.
353 Id.
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the son, now claims citizenship of the United States, "although his
parents when he was born and still are today the subjects of the Em-
peror of China." 3 54 He begins, "[w]e have for many years had the
policy," and catches himself in midsentence, interjecting, "I am now
giving you the argument on one side." He continues noting the long-
standing policy to exclude the Chinese from America, because:
[Tlhis is a race utterly foreign to us, and never will assimilate
with us. They are pagans in religion, so different from us
that they do not intermarry with us, and we don't want to
intermarry with them . . . . [N]o matter how long they have
been here, they make arrangements to be sent back to their
fatherland. [Thus] there is a wide gulf between our civiliza-
tion and their civilization, and we don't want to mix.355
This belief mirrors one of the lesser known aspects of his legen-
dary Plessy v. Ferguson dissent: "There is a race so different from our
own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of
the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese
race. "356
Harlan poses a series of hypotheticals of what "would have been
the condition today of the states of California, Oregon, Washington,
Nevada, and Utah . . . if we had no restriction whatever against the
admission of Chinese in this country."3 7 Fearing that if "fifty million"
of the "two or three hundred million" in China immigrated to the "Pa-
cific slope" with no restrictions, these states "would have been domi-
nated by that race. They would have rooted out the American
population that is there, would have compelled all of the laboring part
of that country to have left and come to other parts of the country to
seek subsistence." 358
Harlan queries:
Can it be possible that the Fourteenth Amendment had the
effect of tying the hands of the Congress of the United States
in the matter of naturalization, so that children born in this
country of people who are Chinese subjects, and who always
remain such, should become citizens of the United States?3 9
354 Id.
355 Id. at 267.
356 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
357 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 267 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
358 Id.
359 Id.
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Harlan feared a scenario wherein a "father and mother [of a] race
[that was] excluded from this country . .. [had a] son by the accident
of his birth in this country" who would be "eligible to the Presidency
of the United States." 36 0
[By] the same principle . .. if some of our own people, Amer-
ican-born and their ancestors American-born . . . [should
give birth to a child] while . . . traveling in foreign lands ...
that son would not be a citizen of the United States [because
he was neither born in the United States nor naturalized in
the United States].361
Harlan asks if the Fourteenth Amendment should have "the ef-
fect of tying the hands of the Congress" so that children of Chinese
subjects should become citizens of the United States.362 Harlan dedi-
cates but a single sentence to presenting the "argument on the other
side," which focuses on the words of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which "embrace just such a cause."3 63 Notwithstanding his excessive
commentary on the issue, Harlan notes that he "do[es] not think [he]
can answer [the questions] yet." 36 4 He concludes by noting, "When
the case is decided I will try and bring it to the attention of the class.
How it may be decided, I do not know. If I did, I would not say."365
But, he most certainly did know how the case would be resolved-
even if he did not say.
2. A Recap of Wong Kim Ark in Class
Justice Harlan more than showed his cards as to how he thought
the case should be decided. United States v. Wong Kim Ark was de-
cided nine days later on March 28, 1898.366 In that case, Justice Harlan
joined Chief Justice Fuller's dissent, arguing that a "Chinaman" born
in the United States to parents who were still subjects of China could
not become a citizen.367 Many of Chief Justice Fuller's arguments
tracked closely with the argument Harlan presented in his lectures.
Both Harlan's lectures and Fuller's opinion note the unwilling-
ness of Chinese immigrants to assimilate and their continued loyalty
360 Id. For further discussions on the meaning of "Natural Born Citizen," see generally
Josh Blackman, Original Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 95 (2010).
361 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 268 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898).
367 See id. at 715 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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to the Emperor of China.36 8 Both also make the exact same comment
that the Framers could not have intended a foreigner born by accident
in the United States to be eligible to run for President, while children
of American citizens born abroad were not:
Considering the circumstances surrounding the framing
of the Constitution, I submit that it is unreasonable to con-
clude that "natural-born citizen" applied to everybody born
within the geographical tract known as the United States, ir-
respective of circumstances; and that the children of foreign-
ers, happening to be born to them while passing through the
country, whether of royal parentage or not, or whether of the
Mongolian, Malay or other race, were eligible to the Presi-
dency, while children of our citizens, born abroad, were
not.369
Harlan held deeply the beliefs he lectured about in class, as he
vigorously argued in favor of his position, but only casually mentioned
the other side's argument in a single sentence.370 One could wonder
how much influence Harlan had in the authorship of Fuller's dissent,
or if Harlan himself had authored parts of it but chose not to claim
ownership.
After the Court decided Wong Kim Ark, Justice Harlan revisited
his previous position on May 7, 1898 when discussing the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.371 He remarked, "[wle had an
illustration of the application of [the Fourteenth Amendment] in the
present term of our Court." 37 2 The "question turns upon two or three
words of this amendment"-actually five words-"subject to the juris-
diction thereof." 373 If Wong Kim Ark "was within the meaning of that
clause, 'subject to the jurisdiction' of the United States, then he be-
came a citizen of the United States, and of the state wherein he re-
sided. The majority of the Court held that he was." 374 "The
368 Id. at 725 ("Generally speaking, I understand the subjects of the Emperor of China-
that ancient Empire, with its history of thousands of years and its unbroken continuity in belief,
traditions and government, in spite of revolutions and changes of dynasty-to be bound to him
by every conception of duty and by every principle of their religion, of which filial piety is the
first and greatest commandment . . . ."); see also Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 266
(Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
369 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 715 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
370 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 266 (Lecture No. 21, Mar. 19, 1898).
371 Id. at 342 (Lecture No. 27, May. 7, 1898).
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 Id.
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minority," which Harlan joined, "held that he was not born [subject]
to the jurisdiction of the United States." 3 75
Harlan explained his reasoning, observing that "[h]e was not born
subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States. Of course, he
owed allegiance to our laws, as every man who comes here, but he was
not born under the jurisdiction of the United States, within the mean-
ing of this article of the Constitution.""3 6 This mirrors the statement
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois made during the ratification de-
bates of the Fourteenth Amendment, cited in the Wong Kim Ark dis-
sent: "What do we mean by 'subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States'? Not owing allegiance to anybody else; that is what it
means. "'
Harlan revisits the example he posed in his earlier class, that was
discussed in Wong Kim Ark, wherein an "English father and mother
went down to Hot Springs [in Arkansas] to get rid of the gout .. . and
while [they were] there, there is a child born."378 The boy goes back to
England. "Is this child a citizen of the United States, born to the juris-
diction thereof, by the mere accident of his birth?" 379 Harlan answers
no.380 His reasoning is more expansive, no longer focusing on his
xenophobic views of the Chinese, but more broadly denying birthright
citizenship to anyone subject to the loyalty of any foreign power. "My
belief [was that the Fourteenth Amendment] was never intended to
embrace everybody in our citizenship if he was the child of parents
who cannot under the law become naturalized in the United
States."38 1 While Congress can grant citizenship to the parents of nat-
ural born citizens, Harlan was unable to believe that "when the boy's
parents could not become citizens of the United States [through the
Constitution, or laws of Congress at that time], that it was possible for
[the boy] to become a citizen of the United States."3 82 Closing with
charm, Harlan conceded, "[o]f course, I am wrong, because only the
Chief Justice and myself held these views, and as the majority decided
the other way, we must believe that we were wrong." 383
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 721 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
378 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 342 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
379 Id.
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 343.
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With his trademark wit, Harlan conceded, "I was one of the mi-
nority, and of course I was wrong." 384
3. Harlan's Enigmatic Approach to Equality
It is perplexing how Justice Harlan could have such a narrow con-
ception of citizenship for Chinese immigrants, given his broad view of
the rights of freed slaves. He alone on the court took the progressive
position that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments authorized
Congress to prohibit racial discrimination by private parties.38 5
Harlan stated that the Equal Protection Clause "says to the states,
take care that you do not apply class legislation," especially laws dis-
criminating on the basis of race or color.3 86 And most remarkably, in
Plessy v. Ferguson, Harlan alone argued that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits "separate but equal" accommodations.3 7 These egali-
tarian principles are reflected in his lectures. When discussing the
Fourteenth Amendment, Harlan boldly proclaimed, "Therefore, it fol-
lows that every negro in the United States, if he had been born there
or has been naturalized in the United States, when [the Fourteenth
Amendment] was adopted became a citizen of the United States and
of the state wherein he resided." 388
Harlan also grounded the Constitution's protections for the
freedmen in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and
its expansion by the Fourteenth Amendment.389 The Constitution
originally spoke only of citizens of the states. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment makes all persons born in the United States and subject to its
jurisdiction citizens of both the state in which they live and the United
States. Harlan characterizes this as a repudiation of Dred Scott, which
held that blacks could not claim privileges and immunities, because
they could not be a citizen of a state without its consent. 390
He criticized those who lament the demise of slavery as of a "past
generation" and as parasites on society.391 Harlan, the former slave
owner who fought on behalf of the Union, considered slavery a great
evil, which created a division among the American people.392 For
384 Id. at 342.
385 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 36-43, 44-54 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
386 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 345 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
387 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
388 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 341 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
389 Id. at 343.
390 See id. at 341.
391 Id. at 339.
392 Id. at 339-40.
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Harlan, an important aspect of the evil of slavery was this division.
Southerners were expected to view slavery as of "divine origin" and
Northerners could not "treat with Christian moderation" Southerners
who supported it.393 Harlan's views on race-contrary to the color-
blindness ascribed to him by the Supreme Court a century later 3 94
can even be seen to support race-based preferences:
[I]f there is a black man who can get ahead of me, I will help
him along, and rejoice. And his progress in life does not ex-
cite my envy. And I am glad to feel and know that it is the
desire of the white people in this country that that race shall
push themselves forward in the race of this life.3 95
Harlan, however, viewed the Civil Rights Amendments to solely
benefit freed slaves, and not Chinese aliens, who were inherently un-
American,396 and did not assimilate into American culture. His views
on equal protection cannot be fully understood unless one considers
how he viewed Chinese-Americans, and their inability to obtain birth-
right citizenship.397
Harlan's lone dissent in Plessy has come to exemplify his presci-
ence and his greatness. According to Loren P. Beth, it is "an appeal
to the conscience of the future: it is thus to be judged on whether it
correctly divined that conscience," and "the box score on Harlan is
perhaps higher than that of any man who has ever occupied the
bench."3 98
And yet, one recent biographer, confounded by the impossibility
of reconciling Harlan's constitutional thought with contemporary con-
stitutional jurisprudence, concluded that he was a "judicial enigma." 39 9
As another recognized, "so great is the chasm between Harlan and us
that some of his words in Plessy seem to make no sense at all." 400 And
393 Id. at 340.
394 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlan's axiom must command our
assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional
principle.").
395 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 341 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898) (emphasis
added).
396 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 724 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment is for the benefit of freed slaves, and not aliens).
397 For more on Justice Harlan's views on Chinese-Americans, see generally Gabriel J.
Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996).
398 Loren P. Beth, Justice Harlan and the Uses of Dissent, 49 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1085, 1086
(1955).
399 See YARBROUGH, supra note 3.
400 PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 3, at 204.
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that is true, as far as it goes. But Harlan's Plessy dissent is not
"strange" merely because it assumes a social reality in which free
blacks still serve whites, making segregation an absurd burden on
both.401 Rather, it and Harlan's other myriad dissents, concurrences,
and opinions are also "strange" because they assume an understand-
ing of the nature of the Constitution very different from our own.
Harlan was indeed an enigma, and his lecture notes only begin to shed
light on this complicated judicial giant.
D. Individual Liberty
Harlan's conception of individual liberty was closely tied to his
view of exceptionalist American liberty. He viewed freedom of
speech and freedom of the press as distinctly American treasures,
standing in stark contrast to European censorship.402 Harlan viewed
religion as an important component of any virtuous state; thus, he
construed the Establishment Clause quite narrowly, agreeing that a
state, as opposed to the federal government, could establish a relig-
ion.403 Harlan's lectures presage his ultimate dissent in Lochner v.
New York, where he recognized the importance of the state to protect
health and safety, and he declined to second-guess the wisdom of leg-
islators in that case. 4 04 Finally, Harlan took a textually provincial view
of gender equality, noting that women could not vote under the Fif-
teenth Amendment-though a woman could be elected President, as
the qualifications in Article II are gender neutral.405
1. Freedom of Speech
After reading from the First Amendment, "Nor shall Congress
'abridge the freedom of speech, or of the press,"' Harlan asked,
"What is freedom of speech?" 4 06 Taking it almost for granted that
Americans understood what freedom of speech meant-and taunting
us a century later-he answered, "Well, I need not say what that is in
America. We certainly have a great deal of free speech here, and we
know what freedom of the press is."407 Like Justice Potter Stewart,
401 Id.
402 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 303-05 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898).
403 Id. at 312-13 (Lecture No. 25, Apr. 23, 1898).
404 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65, 69 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
405 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 346 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
406 Id. at 303 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898).
407 Id.
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Harlan knew it when he saw it.408 Harlan noted that the press has
wide latitude to publish what it sees fit, whether true or false:
We have not only got freedom of the press, but you might
call it the "licentiousness of the press." If there is anything
that a newspaper wants to say, it says it. And it says a great
many things that are not so, but it says them, and you cannot
suppress it. You can hold the manager of that paper respon-
sible for any libel, but that is practically all.4 0 9
When he refers to a libel suit against the manager of a newspaper,
Harlan was likely alluding to the famous trial of John Peter Zenger in
1735, in which a jury acquitted Zenger, a newspaper publisher, of a
charge of seditious libel, finding truth was a defense to libel.410 In
1897, such a manager would not yet be protected by the "actual mal-
ice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.41 1
Harlan, in fact, would rather have a press that peers into public,
as well as private, matters instead of countenancing censorship of the
press, as seen in Europe:
The newspapers of this country are great searchlights
that are looking into everything, not only that which con-
cerns the public, but that which does not concern the public.
And the privilege is abused. But we had better stand it
abused than to have the press subjected-as it is on the con-
tinent of Europe-to a sort of censorship, under which some-
body sitting near a telegraph office in a room adjoining, says
by the authority of government that no telegrams shall go
from this office to a foreign country unless submitted to this
censor. And he strikes this out and that out and the other
out, so that if in such a government they do not want the
truth known, it keeps it back.
Well, we have no trouble of that sort in this country. We
have not only got the truth, but we have got more than the
408 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [of obscene pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligi-
bly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that."
(emphasis added)).
409 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 303-04 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898) (em-
phasis added).
410 Doug Linder, The Trial of John Peter Zenger: An Account, U. Mo.-KAN. Crry SCH. L.
(2001), http://law2.umkc.edulfaculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/zengeraccount.html.
411 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (noting that a statement
about a public official must have been made with "'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" for that official to recover
damages for defamation relating to official conduct).
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truth constantly traveling in the telegrams and newspapers. I
say better that-a thousand times better- than any condi-
tion of things that would subject the press or speech of this
country to a governmental censorship.412
Harlan's view on permitting the press to cover that which is pub-
lic, and private, stands somewhat in contrast with those of his contem-
porary legal scholar (and future Supreme Court Justice) Louis
Brandeis, who, along with Samuel D. Warren, had written The Right
to Privacy in the Harvard Law Review seven years earlier in 1890.413
As Warren and Justice Brandeis lamented, newly invented portable
cameras "rendered it possible to take photographs surreptitiously," 414
greatly weakening the right of people to live private lives. In response
to this new phenomena, with the goal to prevent the "evil of the inva-
sion of privacy by the newspapers" and to "afford some remedy for
the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons," Warren
and Justice Brandeis set out to build from the blocks of existing com-
mon law a right to privacy that would protect the "privacy of the indi-
vidual." 4 15 Analyzing other doctrines of law, including slander, libel,
trade secret, and intellectual property, the scholars formed "the right
'to be let alone.'"416 This right was-and remains to this day-in
some tension with the First Amendment.417 Harlan, however, would
give the presumption to the side of liberty.418
2. Religious Liberty
Harlan was a devout Presbyterian, and remained deeply religious
throughout his life.419 His opinions often reflect religious beliefs. 420
After teaching a Saturday night class at the law school, he would teach
412 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 304 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898).
413 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890).
414 Id. at 211.
415 Id. at 195, 197.
416 Id. at 194-95 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888)).
417 See Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your
Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual's Image Over the Internet,
49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 327 (2009).
418 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 304 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898). See also
generally RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LosT CONSTITuTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY (2004); Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
951 (2011).
419 James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan: A Case Study in Late Nine-
teenth Century Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARO. L. REV. 317, 317 (2001).
420 Id. at 380.
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a men's Bible class Sunday morning at the Presbyterian Church in
Washington. 4 21 Harlan often weaved the scripture into his lectures.
When discussing the uniqueness of the United States Supreme Court,
Harlan noted, "[w]here the thought originated of one Supreme Court,
I do not know. They certainly did not borrow it from any country on
the Earth . . . . It seems to have come providentially into this instru-
ment . . . ."422 Harlan also wove humor and scripture together, re-
marking "The scriptures, I believe, say-these young gentlemen here
that read their Bible every morning will correct me if I am wrong-
that the poor ye have always with you. And so you have the Supreme
Court of the United States always with you." 423 Broadly speaking,
Congress cannot eliminate the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
With a finer point, Harlan conveyed that no one can get rid of the
Supreme Court.
Harlan also recognized that religion played an important role in
the providence of American success, through its grand Constitution.
In a speech given at the Columbian Law School banquet in 1897,
Harlan remarked that he placed the law "next to the church, because
out of the legal profession there came the spirit of order and the sense
of right." 4 24 Harlan also viewed religion as a key element in any virtu-
ous society: "[I]f in the experience of the last two or three hundred
years you point me to any people anywhere on the earth which have
no Sabbath, I will point you to a people that have the seeds of destruc-
tion in their social organization." 42 5
Harlan's reading of the Establishment Clause426 might very well
seem unthinkable to most Americans today, save for Justice Clarence
Thomas.427 He asserted unequivocally that there is nothing in the
Constitution that would stop a state, as opposed to the federal govern-
ment, from establishing an official religion for itself: "[T]his First
Amendment of the Constitution relates only to the powers of the
United States, and there is nothing in that clause of the Constitution
421 Read & Berman, supra note 10, at 66 ("He also taught a men's Bible class at the New
York Avenue Presbyterian Church in Washington for many years and was active in Presbyterian
affairs.").
422 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 239 (Lecture No. 19, Mar. 5, 1898) (emphasis
added).
423 Id. at 234.
424 Columbian Law School Banquet, supra note 128.
425 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 26 (Lecture No. 2, Oct. 21, 1897).
426 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .").
427 See infra notes 434-35 and accompanying text.
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which would prevent a state from establishing a religion." 4 28 Harlan
notes that Virginia had an established religion at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution, but that upon its ratification, James
Madison-backed by Thomas Jefferson and others-led the fight in
Virginia to amend the Commonwealth's Constitution to abolish the
established religion.4 29 Their efforts were successful.4 30
However, Harlan asserts:
[T]here is another clause of the Constitution of the United
States that would have more direct bearing on that, and that
is the clause in the original Constitution to the effect that the
United States shall guarantee to every state in the [U]nion a
republican form of government.
It may very well be doubted whether a state which had
an established religion would have a republican form of
government.431
This reference to the Guarantee Clause432is notable for its seem-
ing inconsistency with some of Harlan's other lectures where he men-
tions that this particular clause has never been found to present a
justiciable question-that is, there are no judicially cognizable stan-
dards by which such a question could be resolved.433 Though Harlan's
view of the Establishment Clause has largely been repudiated by the
Supreme Court,434 Justice Thomas has adopted a similar position.435
428 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 312 (Lecture No. 25, Apr. 23, 1898).
429 See id. at 313.
430 Id.
431 Id. at 312 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4).
432 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
433 See, e.g., id. at 312 (Lecture No. 23, Apr. 2, 1898); id. at 225 (Lecture No. 18, Feb..26,
1898); see also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (holding that the Guarantee
Clause is not justiciable).
434 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) ("The suggestion that government
may establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion
with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted."); Cnty. of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600-02 (1989) (summarizing the Court's refinement of the Estab-
lishment Clause and finding the creche in the county courthouse violated the establishment
clause); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 603, 612-13 (1971) (using three-part test to find two
states' laws granting financial support to church-related, private education violated the Estab-
lishment Clause). For a summary of pre-Lemon Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Josh
Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute's Secu-
lar Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 351, 353-55 (2010).
435 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment only) ("Quite simply, the Establishment Clause is best understood as a
federalism provision-it protects state establishments from federal interference but does not
protect any individual right. These two features independently make incorporation of the
Clause difficult to understand."); see also Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora's Box
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3. Economic Liberty
Harlan's lectures also foreshadowed the views he expressed in his
lesser known, but more moderate dissent in Lochner v. New York. 43 6
Harkening back to his namesake Chief Justice John Marshall's eternal
maxim in Marbury v. Madison-"It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" 437-Harlan ex-
plained that "[t]he judiciary does not make laws, it declares them."4 38
Recognizing the role that the government plays to protect society
from the threats of then-modern day industrialization, Harlan re-
minded his students:
[T]he safety of this country today, the safety of our institu-
tions today, lies mainly in the fact that the judiciary of this
land restricts the exercise of its powers to the declaration of
what the law is, and not assume unnecessarily to pass in judg-
ment upon the wisdom of legislation.4 39
In Lochner, Harlan made much the same point about the Court's
concern about the "wisdom" of legislation: "Whether or not this be
wise legislation it is not the province of the court to inquire. Under
our systems of government the courts are not concerned with the wis-
dom or policy of legislation."440
Harlan also set out for his students the framework he adopted in
Lochner for purposes of reviewing an economic regulation:
You have the exclusive right to use it, but when you take it
into a particular state, you are subject to the laws of that
state, and the state may say it is not reasonable that it should
be used, and if it is a reasonable law, it is bound to be
respected.441
More explicitly, Harlan stated, "Now, the Supreme Court of the
United States long ago said, and that is the rule of the courts of all the
Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 65 (2010) (discussing the Estab-
lishment Clause); Alan Gura, Ilya Shapiro, & Josh Blackman, The Tell-Tale Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 163, 192 (discussing application of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to the protection of constitutionally enumerated rights).
436 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a history of
Lochner, see generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVID-
UAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).
437 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
438 See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 108 (Lecture No. 9, Dec. 11, 1897).
439 Id. (emphasis added).
440 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
441 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 141 (Lecture No. 12, Jan. 16, 1898) (referring
to state regulations regarding sale of patented oil).
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states, that no court shall strike down an act of legislation as unconsti-
tutional and void unless it is clearly so; unless it is palpably so."442
His dissent in Lochner tracks this quotation, almost exactly, with
a focus on palpable unconstitutionality: "Upon this point there is no
room for dispute, for, the rule is universal that a legislative enactment,
Federal or state, is never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it be,
beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative
power."" 3 The statements are nearly identical. Harlan was comforta-
ble with the exercise of judicial review, so long as the courts were not
second-guessing the wisdom of legislators, who had a duty to protect
and safeguard society.4" His lecture follows, almost verbatim, his dis-
sent in Lochner seven years later.
Similarly, Justice Harlan's view of the Contracts Clause" 5 was
laid out to his class in clear terms:
Now, this injunction is that that obligation shall not be
impaired. Not impaired a little, not impaired much, but shall
not be impaired at all. It must stand as the parties have
made it. If it was lawful when made, it is not in the power of
any state to make it unlawful." 6
In Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,"7 however, the
Court rejected Harlan's position, holding that a law "impairs" a con-
tract only if it renders the contract unenforceable. 448
4. Suffrage and Gender Equality
Harlan lectured more than a decade before the ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment, which prevented the denial of the vote to
women.449 His lectures are consistent with the contemporary views
that neither the Fourteenth nor Fifteenth Amendment accomplished
this goal:
442 Id. at 161 (Lecture No. 13, Jan. 22, 1898) (emphasis added).
443 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
444 See id. at 69.
445 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall .. .pass any ... Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts . . . .").
446 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 185 (Lecture No. 15, Feb. 15, 1898).
447 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
448 Id. at 431 ("The obligations of a contract are impaired by a law which renders them
invalid, or releases or extinguishes them and impairment, as above noted, has been predicated of
laws which without destroying contracts derogate from substantial contractual rights.") (citation
and footnote omitted).
449 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX (ratified in 1920).
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Then there often occurs the question, may a state discrimi-
nate against a woman on account of her sex, as far as her
right to vote is concerned? Yes, [the Fifteenth Amendment]
only says "that the right to vote shall not be abridged on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The
word sex is not there. 45 0
According to Harlan, there was nothing in the Constitution (at
that time) that prohibited a state from discriminating against women,
even when it came to the right to vote.451
Still, Harlan, ever the textualist, had no problem with a woman
being able to serve as President, as the qualifications in Article II have
no limitations based on gender-even if the woman candidate could
not vote for herself! "I am asked the question whether or not a wo-
man can be President of the United States. Yes, if the men are willing
that this should occur, she may." 452 All of Harlan's students were
male, and it is unclear how he would have viewed the prospect of a
female lawyer. When discussing the case or controversy requirement
of Article III, Harlan quipped:
You will meet with people who seem to labor under the
impression that it is competent for the courts of the United
States to meet every possible case that may arise in a court of
justice, and particularly if you meet with one of our friends
of the gentler sex who has just come to the conclusion that
she ought to be a lawyer. She [does not] understand why it is
that the courts of the United States cannot dispose of every
case and every question that involves the general welfare. It
is hard to explain it, equally hard to explain it to a man who
[does not] stop to think, and who [does not] read the words
of this Constitution.453
450 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 346 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. XV).
451 Id. But see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92, 210 (1976) (finding that gender-differ-
entiated purchasing ages for low-alcohol beer violated the Equal Protection Clause). The
Court's holding in Craig leads to the conclusion that gender and, a fortiori, race-based discrimi-
nation in voting rights should have been considered egregious violations of the Equal Protection
Clause, rendering the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments entirely superfluous, at least with
regard to their applicability to the states. It may well be the case that Justice Harlan's interpreta-
tion of the scope of equal protection was informed by the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment
was not needed at all, which would also logically lead him to the textual conclusion referred to
above. For more on the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to
women's suffrage, see generally Josh Blackman, Originalism at the Right Time?, 90 TEX. L. REv.
SEE ALso 269 (2012).
452 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 346 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
453 Id. at 244-45 (emphasis added).
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IV. HARLAN THE SEER
When Harlan delivered his lectures, the Constitution was under-
going a process of transformation. Today, though the Court has
adopted many of Harlan's conclusions, it has not necessarily adopted
his reasons. While modern reformers find many of Harlan's conclu-
sions congenial, they may find his reasoning less palatable. Their
Constitution reflects the idealist assumptions of a liberal future.
Harlan's Constitution reflects the traditional principles of a republican
past. And yet, the conundrum remains: somehow Harlan managed to
simultaneously look backward and anticipate modern civil liberties,
even as his forward-looking brethren foundered. The reason is both
simple and critical-judges and lawyers can make laws, but they can-
not make a constitution. Harlan did not merely anticipate the future
Constitution. He created it. Much as the colonial Americans created
a liberal revolution out of a mythological past, Harlan created a lib-
eral Constitution out of traditional rights. Thus, by understanding
Harlan, we come to understand not just how the Constitution works in
the present, but how it comes to transform the future.
Harlan's prescient opinions were well ahead of his time. In his
classroom, he provided his students with insights into how constitu-
tional law would develop well into the twentieth century, with respect
to the doctrine of incorporation, the scope of Congress's powers under
the commerce clause, the Erie doctrine and vertical comity, and the
evolution of separation of powers.
A. Incorporation
At the time of their ratification, the first ten amendments to the
Constitution were not a true bill of rights, because they limited only
the powers of the federal government to infringe on individual liberty,
not those of the states.454 Only a state constitution could contain a bill
of rights declaring the rights of an individual.455 The Fourteenth
Amendment created the Bill of Rights as we know it today.456 But
with the Fourteenth Amendment, judges gradually began to tell a new
constitutional story, emphasizing national, individual rights. Harlan
recognized that "one of the largest questions before the courts of this
country yet to determine . . . is what rights are secured against state
action by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 57 At the time
454 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 284-85 (1998).
455 See id.
456 See id.; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
457 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 251 (Lecture No. 20, Mar. 12, 1898).
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on the Court, Harlan alone argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Bill of Rights against the states. 458 The first reference
to selective incorporation appears in Justice Harlan's dissent in
Hurtado v. California,45 9 where Harlan would have found the right to
a grand jury indictment was required in state prosecutions. 46 0 History
would vindicate Harlan's view that the Bill of Rights applies to the
states.
1. Harlan's Prescient Opinions
Although Harlan's dissent in Hurtado seems to advocate selective
incorporation, his discussion is somewhat vague. 46 1 According to Pro-
fessor Jerold Israel, "Justice Harlan's dissent . . . arguably also may be
viewed as based on a selective incorporation theory, but his analysis is
ambiguous and the opinion might be urging total incorporation." 4 62
Israel claims, "Justice Harlan's dissent, although focusing on the his-
tory and importance of the grand jury, suggested at one point that a
right might be established as an essential element of due process
solely by virtue of its inclusion in the Bill of Rights." 463 He adds that
the "reasoning, of course, would have led to incorporation of all of the
Bill of Rights as part of due process."*
Harlan's dissent implied an incorporation doctrine without ex-
plicitly naming one or agreeing with it. In fact, Harlan employed the
term "incorporation" just twice. The first reference has to do with the
colonists' incorporation of English common law: "These declarations
were subsequently emphasized in the most imposing manner, when
the doctrines of the common law respecting the protection of the peo-
ple in their lives, liberties, and property were incorporated into the
earlier constitutions of the original States."465
Harlan's opinion in Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chi-
cago,46 6 decided one year before his lecture on March 1, 1897, ex-
tended the Takings Clause-somewhat obliquely-to the states.467
458 See id.
459 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 540-41 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
460 Id.
461 Id.
462 Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 253 n.1 (1982).
463 Id. at 279 n.188.
464 Id.
465 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 540 (1884) (Harlan, J. dissenting) (emphasis
added).
466 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
467 Id. at 241.
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This 1897 precedent predating the modern incorporation doctrine did
not incorporate the Fifth Amendment, but rather considered the tak-
ing as a violation of due process.468 A century later, in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,469 citing Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R., the Su-
preme Court held that the "Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the government from taking private property for public use without
just compensation."4 70 Harlan was one hundred years ahead of his
time.
2. Grand Jury Clause
The Grand Jury Clause 4 71 was a recurring theme in Justice
Harlan's lectures. Today, many people consider the grand jury a
quaint relic. In most jurisdictions, it provides no protection against
unjust prosecution, because a grand jury will "indict a ham sand-
wich." 472 Virtually every Justice has asked whether fundamental fair-
ness requires a grand jury. Not Harlan. He insisted that the
Constitution, as modified by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires in-
dictment by a grand jury in all criminal cases, simply because the com-
mon law required a grand jury: "My own view," Harlan lectured, "was
that it was not competent for a state, since the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, to proceed against any man for his life except by
indictment of a grand jury." 47 3
Much to his obvious dismay, the Court did not share his view of
the importance of the clause. Harlan added in class, "Now presuma-
bly I am wrong, because I stood alone, and the law must be held oth-
erwise." 474 The case of Hurtado v. California repeatedly revealed his
less-than-lighthearted disagreement with some recent precedent. 4 75
The lack of levity was especially striking on the evening of March 12,
1898, when Justice Harlan flatly said, "I can add nothing tonight to
what I said in that opinion." 476 Harlan recognized that by nationaliz-
468 Id.
469 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
470 Id. at 617 (citation omitted).
471 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
472 Marcia Kramer & Frank Lombardi, New Top State Judge: Abolish Grand Juries & Let
Us Decide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 31, 1985, at 3 (quoting Judge Sol Wachtler).
473 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 310 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898); see also
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
474 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 310 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898).
475 See id at 252-53 (Lecture No. 20, Mar. 12, 1898); id. at 310 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16,
1898); id. at 312 (Lecture No. 25, Apr. 23, 1898).
476 Id. at 253 (Lecture No. 20, Mar. 12, 1898) (referring to Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538-58
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ing individual rights, the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the Barron
v. Baltimore47 7 status quo untenable. Against those who criticized fed-
eral intervention in state laws, Harlan declared, "there is no provision
in the Federal Constitution to which we should cling harder than the
Fourteenth Amendment." 47 8 Harlan made no joke about his being in
dissent in this case.
3. Right to Jury Trial
Harlan felt similarly about the Petit Jury Clause.479 To Harlan,
the significance of the right to trial by jury stretched back to the
Magna Carta: "We have preserved in our fundamental law this right of
trial by jury."4 80 According to Harlan, "there is no feature of our An-
glo-Saxon civilization today that lies more nearly to the liberty of man
than the right of a trial by the old-fashioned jury composed of twelve
honest men." 4 81 He began by arguing that judges appointed on good
behavior are more independent than elected judges. 482 He then tied
the jury trial guarantee to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which he believed extends this same right to apply
against the states. 4 83 Thus, for Harlan, due process of law did not
mean fairness, but rigorous adherence to traditional procedures. He
continued with a discussion of the Treason Clause, using Justice Mar-
shall's conduct during the trial of Aaron Burr as an example of how
appointed judges preserve constitutional principles in the face of
mercurial popular sentiment.484
Harlan felt strongly about the right to a jury trial:
So, along in that line of cases is the large question, not
yet concluded, that as to whether a state may dispense with a
petit jury or modify the trial as it was at the time of the adop-
(1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Harlan displayed similar impatience when remarking
briefly on the cases of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 638-86 (1895)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (income taxation), and Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110-23 (1884)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (Native American citizenship). See Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note
1, at 176-77 (Lecture 15, Feb. 5, 1898); id. at 265 (Lecture 21, Mar. 19, 1898). Following McDon-
ald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), the Supreme Court has declined to consider any
cases that would require the incorporation of the Grand Jury Clause. See infra notes 498-500
and accompanying text.
477 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
478 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 345 (Lecture No. 27, May 7, 1898).
479 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
480 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 24 (Lecture No. 2, Oct. 21, 1897).
481 Id. at 250 (Lecture No. 20, Mar. 12, 1898).
482 See id at 243-44.
483 Id. at 251-52.
484 Id. at 253-55.
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tion of the Constitution? I answer unhesitatingly that no
court of the United States can try a man for any crime by a
jury less than twelve, or can sentence any man upon the re-
turn of a verdict of jury in which all the jury have not
concurred. 4 85
It should be noted that the phrase "court of the United States" all
but certainly means both federal and state courts. The context bears
this out, even if the language used today commonly connotes only fed-
eral courts.48 6 While the Supreme Court has found that the right to a
jury trial is incorporated against the states,4 87 the Court has also held
that a jury of less than twelve is constitutionally permissible. 48 8 Most
recently, the Supreme Court declined to review 489 a challenge to
Apodaca v. Oregon,4 90 which had held-in a fractured, confusing opin-
ion-that a defendant could be convicted by a less than unanimous
jury verdict. 491
4. Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Harlan also believed that the protections of the Eighth Amend-
ment should apply to the states. After the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment, States could no longer inflict cruel and unusual
punishments on their prisoners:
That clause [of the Eighth Amendment] did not stand in the
way of any state imposing a cruel and unusual punishment.
But now the Fourteenth Amendment says that no state shall
deprive any man of life, liberty, or property without due pro-
cess of law. Suppose a state today should pass a law intro-
ducing the punishments of torture, a law which would
authorize some ministerial officer to put a man to torture in
485 Id. at 252.
486 See id.
487 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
488 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970).
489 State v. Herrera, 14 P.3d 102 (Or. Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct, 904 (2011). See
generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Herrara, 131 S.Ct. 904 (No. 10-344) (urging the Su-
preme Court to decline to follow the fractured decision of Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972), in which no rationale received five votes).
490 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
491 See id. at 411 ("In terms of this function we perceive no difference between juries re-
quired to act unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to
one. Requiring unanimity would obviously produce hung juries in some situations where
nonunanimous juries will convict or acquit. But in either case, the interest of the defendant in
having the judgment of his peers interposed between himself and the officers of the State who
prosecute and judge him is equally well served.") (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
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order to make him confess before he was tried. Or suppose
it provided the punishment of burning a man at the stake if
he was convicted of a particular crime. Is that due process of
law? Is the state prohibited from resorting to any mode of
punishment of that sort?492
To Harlan, among the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. This conception of what we now call
incorporation was an early incarnation of the notion of substantive
due process. The Supreme Court ultimately adopted this position in
Robinson v. California.4 93
5. Incorporation in the Twentieth Century
For much of the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court had
difficulty coming to grips with how rights in the first eight Amend-
ments to the Constitution should be extended to the states.494 In 1947,
Justice Frankfurter dismissed Harlan's argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights in its entirety, referring to
him as the "only" Justice to hold that view, and "respectfully" calling
him "an eccentric exception." 495 In a sense, Frankfurter was right.
For Frankfurter, as for many other justices, "safeguarding and pro-
moting the interests of liberty and human dignity through law" re-
quired only attentiveness to fundamental fairness, not zealous
preservation of procedural safeguards.4 96 Perhaps Frankfurter was
right to see many of the common law rights on which Harlan insisted
as "the restricted views of Eighteenth-Century England regarding the
best methods for the ascertainment of facts." 4 97
The Court to this day still has not settled on a single approach to
the incorporation of rights. Justice Thomas has even declared that the
entirety of the twentieth's century incorporation jurisprudence
through the due process clause was flawed; rather, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is the appropriate channel.498 A century earlier,
492 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 252 (Lecture No. 20, Mar. 12, 1898).
493 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
494 See Duncan v. Louisana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, (1964);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
495 See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
496 See id.
497 See id. at 63.
498 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3083-84 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (finding that the right to keep and bear arms is a privilege under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause). For further reading on the Privileges or Immunities Clause as it relates to
the right to keep and bear arms, see generally Gura, Shapiro & Blackman, supra note 435. For a
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Harlan briefly mentioned the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not enumerating the rights it guarantees, but
specifying that a person may appeal their abrogation by a state:
[T]he question arises whether or not these privileges in the
first ten amendments are not privileges pertaining to citizen-
ship of the United States, and is it now, since the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, in the power of any state to
take away from anyone the privileges conferred by those
amendments. 499
History refutes Frankfurter's flippant aside, as the Court has in-
crementally incorporated nearly every provision of the Bill of Rights,
with the exception of Harlan's cherished Grand Jury Clause. To this
day, the grand jury right is one of the few provisions in the Bill of
Rights not incorporated against the states. In fact, during oral argu-
ments in McDonald v. City of Chicago-which considered whether
the right to keep and bear arms should be extended to the states-two
Justices asked about the implications of the Grand Jury Clause not
being incorporated.500 Ultimately, Harlan's supposed anachronism-
not Frankfurter's realism-made it possible for the Constitution to
guarantee modern civil rights. Frankfurter described reality, but
Harlan, a half century earlier, transformed it. If Harlan was an "ec-
centric exception," exceptionalism is the key to the American national
myth.
B. The Commerce Clause
The scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause
stands today as one of the most hotly debated questions of constitu-
tional law. Over a hundred years ago, Harlan recognized how impor-
tant this provision would become. Harlan wisely instructed his
students-many of whom would later become the officials administer-
ing the New Deal and defending it in court-to pay close attention to
the Commerce Clause:
detailed account of McDonald v. City of Chicago, see generally Blackman & Shapiro, supra note
435.
499 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 309 (Lecture No. 24, Apr. 16, 1898).
500 Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg expressed concern that if the right to keep and bear
arms was incorporated, states would also need to provide indictments by grand juries. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 4, 62-63, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-
1521), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/2009_08_1521 (Justice Sotomayor:
"What injustice has-has been caused by it that we have to remedy? Meaning States have relied
on having no grand juries . . . ."; Justice Ginsburg: "So you are saying that under-under your
view, every State would have to use a grand jury to bring criminal charges; no more
information.").
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Now, there is a line of decisions in this country that you
ought to become familiar with on that subject, for I can state
to you with entire confidence that when you get to the bar
and have a good practice in your profession, and you become
connected with cases involving constitutional law, probably
the most important you will have are those connected with
the commerce of the country.501
To Harlan, commerce wholly within one state could not be inter-
state commerce:
There is a commerce with which the United States has noth-
ing to do, the power to control which has never been granted
to the United States. Take commerce between the City of
New York and the City of Rochester, New York, for in-
stance, or commerce between Alexandria and the City of
Richmond, Virginia, or commerce between the City of Cin-
cinnati and Columbus, Ohio. That is purely domestic. That
commerce commences in a state and ends in the same
state.502
Harlan recognized that matters solely within the province of the
state were not the business of the federal government:
[T]he government of the United States has no more to do
with it than it has with the commerce in the interior of China.
The states have never granted to the government of the
United States the power to control those things, and it is well
that they have not. If the power to control the internal do-
mestic trade of the states belonged to the government of the
United States, there would be foundation for the apprehen-
sion of some that all powers of localities and municipalities
in this country would be lost sight of in a vast centralized
government, and the men who framed this Constitution were
wise in the thought that there were many things that could
not be controlled by the United States.50 3
Harlan's apprehensions-that the powers of the states would be
lost amidst the "vast centralized government"-proved prudent, as
the scope of an unlimited commerce power is of the utmost impor-
tance today at the Supreme Court.
However, Harlan lamented the difficulty of the national govern-
ment addressing problems of local nature:
501 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 121 (Lecture No. 10, Dec. 18, 1897) (emphasis
added).
502 Id. at 117.
503 Id.
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I am speaking of the difficulty in our present system of get-
ting proper attention to matters that concern the nation.
What would we do if all these merely local affairs that belong
now exclusively to the states were under the control of the
Congress of the United States, simply because you call it
commerce? No, the kind of commerce which Congress can
regulate is commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, that is commerce between the states.5 04
Yet, Harlan realized that the society of the future may not com-
port with how the Constitution was understood at the time of its
adoption.
When that Constitution was adopted, no man of that day had
the slightest idea that he would be able to start from the City
of New York in the morning at ten o'clock and find himself
in Chicago the next day at nine o'clock. The commerce that
was then thought of was commerce on water, commerce on
navigable waters; the commerce between the City of New
York, for instance, and Savannah, Georgia, by the ocean;
commerce from the City of New York to Philadelphia, partly
by ocean and partly by Delaware River. Nobody ever
thought then of steam railways, and yet it is practically well
settled at this day, and settled some while back, that that pro-
vision of the Constitution of the United States embraces
commerce across the country by railroad as well as com-
merce upon the navigable waters of the United States.505
Harlan, with his eyes to the future, inspired his students to think
of how the evolution of technology would further revolutionize the
nature of interstate commerce.
And that suggests a line of thought that no doubt has
occurred to you. It suggests a subject about which the public
mind of this country is very much divided today, and so
much divided that no statesman is able to speak with very
great confidence as to what can be, or ought to be done. If,
as undoubtedly is the fact, commerce between the City of
New York and the City of San Francisco across lines of rail-
way is commerce, that may be regulated by the United
States. What shall be the extent of regulation that the gov-
ernment of the United States will undertake? How far will it
go? 506
504 Id. at 118.
505 Id. at 119.
506 Id. at 119-20.
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Harlan, who was lecturing on the precipice of the Industrial
Revolution, looked ahead a century at what would soon be an explo-
sion in the need for Congress to regulate commerce and trade among
the several states:
What would we do if all these merely local affairs that belong
now exclusively to the states were under the control of the
Congress of the United States simply because you call it
commerce?
Now, the difficult question that cannot be solved by any
rule today that would be applicable a hundred years from
now is, what may be done under the power to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations and among the several states?507
Echoing modern constitutional debates, the pressing question for
Harlan was what would be the limiting principle of Congress's powers
if everything is considered interstate commerce?
Harlan later expressed these views in the Lottery Case,508 where
the Court held that trafficking lottery tickets constituted interstate
commerce, and Congress could regulate it.509 As fate would have it,
Harlan now seems somewhat clairvoyant in his fears.5t0 Harlan was
quite cognizant of the import of the Commerce Clause:
Now, these questions thus suggested will indicate to you
what vast power lurks under that clause of the Constitution
of the United States, but as vast as that power is, and
whatever may be the dangers that are to come from its exer-
cise, it had better be there; it had better rest with the govern-
ment of the United States than to rest with each state as to
what shall be charged for the transportation of persons and
freight across that state.511
507 Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
508 Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
509 Id. at 363-64.
510 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005) ("Congress can regulate purely intra-
state activity that is not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that
failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in
that commodity."); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) ("But even if appellee's activity
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as
'direct' or 'indirect."').
511 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 121 (Lecture No. 10, Dec. 18, 1897).
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To this day, the Supreme Court still has not come to a conclusion
about the scope of that "vast power."5 12
C. The Erie Doctrine and Vertical Comity
Harlan's discussion on the legitimacy of federal common law and
the importance of vertical comity in federalism eerily foreshadows the
Erie doctrine some forty years before it was created. In a lecture on
January 29, 1898, almost fifty-six years to the day after Swift v. Ty-
son513 was decided, Justice Harlan offered his students this lesson on
the role of federal courts and the common law:
Do not get that idea in your heads, that the courts of the
United States are courts of a foreign government. A judge
of the court of the United States, sitting in the State of New
York, sits there to administer in part-and that is the most
that he does-the laws of the State of New York, the court
getting jurisdiction by reason of diverse citizenship. And a
federal court sitting in the State of New York is in every
sense a court of the State of New York, and the Supreme
Court of the United States is a court for all the states and all
the people of all the states.514
Contrast that statement with then-prevailing law from Swift v.
Tyson's holding that the federal courts developed a common law dis-
tinct from the law of the state.515 Now fast-forward forty years to Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins516:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be
declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no
federal general common law. Congress has no power to de-
clare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State
whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause
512 See generally Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2568 (2012). For further
reading on the Health Care Cases, see JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE (2013); Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism,
16 CHAPMAN L. REv. 325 (2013); Josh Blackman, Popular Constitutionalism and the Affordable
Care Act, 26 PuB. AFF. 0. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfmabstract-id=2217965.
513 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
514 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 172-73 (Lecture No. 14, Jan. 29, 1898).
515 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19.
516 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts.517
After discussing the uncontroversial proposition that the Su-
preme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review the final
judgments of state courts,518 Justice Harlan quickly dispelled any no-
tion that state courts possess any such reciprocal authority. He ex-
plained that a state may not issue a writ of habeas corpus to federal
authorities:
Now that was Tarble's case in 13th Wallace, and there it was
settled that the state authorities could not disturb the United
States authorities. Why the difference? One reason of the
difference is-and that is an all-sufficient one-that one is
the supreme government of the country, the highest govern-
ment of the country.519
In this sense, Justice Harlan's views presaged the slow demise of
Swift v. Tyson, and the ultimate repudiation of federal common law in
1938.
Likewise, ten years before the Court decided Ex Parte Young,520
Justice Harlan grudgingly predicted-or perhaps conceded-the out-
come: "Now, it has been held time and again that a suit against an
officer of a state to prevent him from executing an unconstitutional
law of that state is not a suit against the state, and that it can be insti-
tuted." 521 While Harlan dissented in Ex Parte Young a decade later,
arguing that such a suit should not be permitted, perhaps he realized
that it was inevitable. 522 Harlan recognized the evolution of Erie and
vertical comity well before his time.
517 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
518 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 172 (Lecture No. 14, Jan. 29, 1898) (citing
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)).
519 Id. (citing Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871)).
520 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
521 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 338 (Lecture No. 26, Apr. 30, 1898).
522 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 175-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("This principle, if firmly
established, would work a radical change in our governmental system. It would inaugurate a
new era in the American judicial system and in the relations of the National and state govern-
ments. It would enable the subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the official ac-
tion of the States as if they were 'dependencies' or provinces. It would place the States of the
Union in a condition of inferiority never dreamed of when the Constitution was adopted or
when the Eleventh Amendment was made a part of the Supreme Law of the Land. I cannot
suppose that the great men who framed the Constitution ever thought the time would come
when a subordinate Federal court, having no power to compel a State, in its corporate capacity,
to appear before it as a litigant, would yet assume to deprive a State of the right to be repre-
sented in its own courts by its regular law officer.").
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D. Separation of Powers
To Harlan, one of the most unique aspects of our system of gov-
ernment was the separation of powers, both between the three
branches, as well as between the states and the federal government.
Harlan's discussions about setting the qualifications of representa-
tives, Congress choosing their own rules, bicameralism and present-
ment, and appointment of executive branch officials presaged many of
the larger separation of powers conflicts in the twentieth century.
1. Qualifications of Representatives
In all of the Constitution's provisions which may arguably en-
shrine some principle of federalism, perhaps the most unassuming
provides that "[tihe Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators." 523 Of that clause, Justice Harlan lectured, "There is no
more important provision in the Constitution than that, nor one about
which there is a larger amount of ignorance, or none about which
more unmeaning or senseless things are said." 524
Though Harlan was, at times, prone to hyperbole, his point
should not be lost on us today. During his lecture on November 20,
1897, Justice Harlan took the opportunity to opine on the role of the
states in defining the national identity in our federalist framework:
We must not forget that a member of the House of Rep-
resentatives is not there simply as the representative of the
people of his district. He represents in a sense the whole
country ....
It is not to be entertained for a moment that any state of
this union can act as it pleases in the matter of sending Rep-
resentatives to Congress beyond the power of the United
States.525
This theory of who members of Congress in fact represent, has
been the subject of much scholarly debate.526 It would be nearly a
523 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The second clause, less consequentially, merely provides
that "[t]he Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the
first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 4, cl. 2 (emphasis denotes portion of the clause modified by U.S. CONsT. amend. XX).
524 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 78 (Lecture No. 7, Nov. 20, 1897).
525 Id. at 78-79.
526 See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (No. 93-1456).
2013]1 1131
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
century, however, before the Supreme Court weighed in on the pre-
cise issue in any definitive way.
The Court in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,52 7 per Justice
Stevens, held that the imposition of term limits for Congressional can-
didates by Arkansas was not a regulation of the time, place, or man-
ner of choosing representatives, but rather an impermissible
restriction on the qualifications for that office.528  In so doing, the
Court noted that in our federal government, "representatives owe pri-
mary allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the
Nation." 5 29 Stressing the significance of this issue, Justice Scalia said,
"This is the most important federalism case that has been heard dur-
ing my time on the bench." 530 Moderating the 5-4 ruling, as usual,
was Justice Kennedy.531 Echoing the views of Justice Harlan, a cen-
tury earlier, 532 Justice Kennedy forcefully stated, "That the States may
not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my
view, as the corollary proposition that the Federal Government must
be held within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon
527 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
528 Id. at 829-30.
529 Id. at 803 (quoting 1 STORY, supra note 164, § 627) (further commenting that "each
Member of Congress is 'an officer of the union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the
constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states .... Those
officers owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of
the people."'); see also 2 STORY, supra note 164, § 626.
530 Jerry de Jaager, Justice Scalia Comes Home to the Law School, RECORD, Spring 2012,
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumnilmagazine/springl2/scalia.
531 See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy began his
opinion with a conciliatory nod to the dissenters-Justice Thomas's opinion was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Scalia-"The majority and dissenting opinions demon-
strate the intricacy of the question whether or not the Qualifications Clauses are exclusive." Id.
at 838.
532 Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 841-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Though he joined the opin-
ion of the Court in full, Kennedy's concurring opinion developed a slightly more nuanced view
of the theoretical federalism at play in the case:
The political identity of the entire people of the Union is reinforced by the proposi-
tion, which I take to be beyond dispute, that, though limited as to its objects, the
National Government is, and must be, controlled by the people without collateral
interference by the States. McCulloch affirmed this proposition as well, when the
Court rejected the suggestion that States could interfere with federal powers. "This
was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their gov-
ernment dependent on the States." The States have no power, reserved or other-
wise, over the exercise of federal authority within its proper sphere.
Id. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819)). "The federal character of congressional elections flows from the
political reality that our National Government is republican in form and that national citizenship
has privileges and immunities protected from state abridgment by the force of the Constitution
itself." Id. at 842.
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matters reserved to the States." 3 3 With this discussion, we see how
Justice Harlan's views were quite ahead of his time, and how he fore-
saw monumental developments in the constitutional law of federalism
far into the future.
2. Congress Choosing Its Own Rules
Harlan viewed the power of Congress to set its own rules as un-
challengeable in court: "If the House of Representatives should by a
resolution, however wrong, however against law, declare the seat of A
vacant, that is the end of the matter. You cannot appeal to any power
on the subject." 534 The Warren Court later held to the contrary in
Powell v. McCormack,35 finding that a virtually identical situation
presented a justiciable issue.536
3. Bicameralism and Presentment
Harlan stressed the importance of bicameralism and presentment
for a bill to become a law: "Is it a law when you show that alone [both
houses concurred]? No. It shall be presented to the President of the
United States. That is an essential prerequisite."537 This principle was
only recognized, formally a century later in INS v. Chadha.538
4. Appointment of Officers
With respect to the Appointments Clause, Harlan took a rather
formalist view: "Congress cannot create an ambassador, and say who
shall fill it. The President has the appointment of all officers of the
United States, with the single exception that he may invest the ap-
pointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments."53 9 This
view was arguably repudiated in Morrison v. Olson,54 0 however, in
which the Court upheld Congress's scheme for court appointment of
independent counsel.541
533 Id. at 841 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
534 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 67 (Lecture No. 6, Nov. 13, 1897).
535 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
536 Id. at 547-48.
537 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 93 (Lecture No. 8, Dec. 4, 1897).
538 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (holding unicameral legislative veto vio-
lated the separation of powers).
539 Justice Harlan's Lectures, supra note 1, at 225 (Lecture No. 18, Feb. 26, 1898).
540 Although the Court found the independent counsel to be an inferior officer, a substan-
tial argument can be made that she was in fact a principal officer who should have been ap-
pointed by the President. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 715-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
541 Id. at 677.
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CONCLUSION
Today, John Marshall Harlan is widely considered one of the
greatest Justices in the history of the Supreme Court.542 On the mer-
its, his opinions often seem uncannily ahead of their time. Many of his
majority opinions still hold, and his dissents were clarion calls for
change, heeded by future generations. Somehow, Harlan alone di-
vined how the Court would eventually interpret the Constitution. His
lectures provide a portal back in time, showing how Harlan viewed
the most controversial constitutional issues of his day and ours. His
opinions in class, unlike the opinions on the Court, were unencum-
bered by the confines of building majorities, or by the constraints of
stare decisis. What his students learned in class was the Constitution,
according to John Marshall Harlan.
542 See Granite Valley Hotel Ltd. P'ship. v. Jackpot Junction Bingo & Casino, 559 N.W.2d
135, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ("It took 58 years to be persuasive, but his place in history is
secure. We know his name. Without looking it up, name me all the majority writers in Plessy.
Name me three? Name me one?").
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